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ABSTRACT
ABSTRACT: The purpose of the thesis is to explore the effects
of time perception and threat perception by decision-making 
elites on the decisions they make during crisis periods of in­
ternational conflicts. A series of four decisions involving 
World War I, the Korean War, (US and Chinese involvement) and 
the Cuban crisis will be analyzed using qualitative content 
analysis techniques to evaluate the efficacy of the following 
hypotheses:
A. As perceived threat increases, time is seen as an 
increasingly salient factor.
B. As the perception of threat increases, decision­
makers focus on immediate future needs to the exclusion of 
long range considerations.
C. The shorter the perceived time available to decision­
makers, the fewer real alternative courses of action will be 
considered.
Floyd Vincent Churchill Jr«
Department of Government 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
THE ROLE OF THREAT AND TIME PERCEPTION 
IN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
INTRODUCTION
"One of the great organizational problems
for mankind is the control of violence or
the control of conflict situations to the
point that procedural institutions axe
1
adequate to handle it”•
It is unlikely that any student of mankind would serious­
ly dispute this statement by Kenneth Boulding. Violence, con­
flict and war have been problems of major importance since 
history was first recorded. As man became more sophisticated 
in his approach to the World in which he lived, he also became 
more accomplished in his ability to generate violence and 
destruction. With the advent of the nuclear era, this fright­
ful ability to destroy took a quantum jump to levels beyond 
the comprehension of any man. In such an environment the impera­
tive put forth above, became considerably more compelling than 
it was even a generation ago.
The reaching of this goal has proved highly elusive. As
1
Kenneth E, Boulding, Conflict and Defense 
(New York, 1962) 225.
2
of this writing, there stiril exists no general theory of con-
2
flict which is acceptable to the various social sciences# 
Authorities in each field have tended to approach the pheno­
menon of conflict and its control from highly parochial view­
points# If a comprehensive general theory is to be developed, 
it will require contributions from a wide range of social 
science disciplines: history, sociology, psychology, anthro­
pology, political science and communications and organization 
theory to mention but a few#
It is with this realization that this work is offered for 
inclusion into the body of research being done to narrow the 
gap that exists within and between the various branches of 
social sciences# The objective of the author in preparing this 
work is to produce something of value and importance, however 
modest, to the multi-disciplinary approach to the study of 
specific facets of the conflict situation: in this instance, 
the role of threat perception and time in crisis decision­
making# It is the opinion of the author, both as a student of 
political science and as a professional soldier, that the con­
clusions of this study are of some merit and can, along vri.th 
more substantial research, assist in developing the instruments
2
James E# Dougherty, Contending Theories of International 
Relations (New York, 1971) 138.
4required to atenuate conflict situations. It is not claimed
that this work provides definitive answers to all it studies,
but rather that it is a positive addition to a growing body of 
knowledge dealing with a nebulous quality of existence called 
"conflict1'.
The two factors chosen for observation here (threat per­
ception and time) were not chosen in an arbitrary manner. As 
a student of military history, my attention has been drawn on
numerous occasions, to the salieney of these factors in crisis 
decision-making. It is the contention of the author that a
better understanding of these two elements in the conflict en­
vironment can be of both immediate practical value to those who 
are expected to make decisions in high stress situations, and 
of longer range value in the development of more adequate hypo­
theses to explain the phenomenon of conflict in its many forms.
As briefly mentioned above, a distinct effort has been 
made in this research to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach 
to the task at hand. The crisis periods which follow were 
analyzed by using a framework built around the decision-making 
approach to crisis decision outputs. However, elements from 
other "micro" analysis approaches, such as the psychological 
factors, ware combined with "macro" approaches such as geography, 
political science, and systems theory to overcome the major 
objections usually noted to the decision-making, approach.
Because of the variation in information available, ac­
cess to primary sources, and structural organization of that 
information which was available, the analysis of the crisis 
under investigation will be conducted using the traditional
case study method or, as Ithiel De Sola Pool refers to it, a
3
“qualitative analysis" approach* Accordingly the conclusions 
reached will be supported, in the main, by illustration and 
argument, rather than by more systematic presentation of a 
larger body of evidence• Qualitative Analysis presupposes that 
the decision-makers were purposeful in their actions and com­
munications, and infers goals, expectations and attitudes by a 
reverse process than that used by the decision-makers* In 
some ideal world in which all required information would be 
available, the process of investigation could proceed in the 
same manner in which decisions are made* The process might be 
graphically portrayed thus:
Situat­
ional
Factors
Elite 
Es­
timates
Elite 
Expect- 
at ions
Elite
Policy
Inten­
tions
Spkrs
propa­
ganda
goal
Content
Indic­
ators
Unfortunately the real world is seldom in accord with the ideal 
model* As a consequence of the non-availability of some docu-
3
Ithiel De Sola Pool, Trends in Content Analysis 
(Urbana, 1959), 7*
6merits and the impossibility of knowing definitely the unrecorded
attitudes of key decision-makers, the analysis of information
actually occurrs in an inverse sequence* The process appears
4
graphically in the following pattern:
Elite
Esti­
mates
Elite
Policy
Inten­
tions
Content
Indi­
cators
Elite 
Expect 
ations
Situa­
tional
Factors
Spkrs 
Propagan­
da Goal
In all cases extensive use is made of all primary sources 
available to determine the psychological state of the partici­
pants as closely as possible* Additionally, information on rele­
vant symbolic behavior (such as the involvement of troops) was 
gathered to expand the researcher's perspective in viewing the 
crisis periods in question.
As it is hoped that this work will prove fruitful to 
others pursuing similar research, so the hypotheses for the pre­
sent study were selected from previous work by Charles F. Hermann
5in this field* The hypotheses to be investigated here are:
1* As the perception of threat increases, time is seen
as an increasingly salient factor*
4
Ibid. 18.
5
Charles F. Hermann International Crisis: Insights From 
Behavioral Research (New York, 1972) 320-321.
7
/
2* As the perception of threat increases, decision­
makers focus on immediate future needs to the exclusion of long 
range considerations*
3* The shorter the perceived time available to decision­
makers the fewer real alternative courses of action will be con­
sidered*
Given the lack of consensus on basic concepts and term­
inology in the study of conflict and crisis, it is appropriate 
at this point to define a few key terms* Threat perception and 
time compression will be discussed in some detail in the first 
chapter, and so will be omitted here* The other terms which 
need definition are listed below. The particular definitions
are those used by Kenneth Boulding in his book Conflict and
6
Defense (1962).
1. Conflict - any situation in which both parties are 
aware of the incompatability of potential future positions and 
each wishes to occupy a position that is incompatable with the
wishes of the other.
2. Crisis - a situation of unanticipated threat to
important goals/values and restricted decision time.
3* Decision-making elites/group - that group of
6
Kenneth E* Boulding. Conflict and Defense
*  — Tcw n gapaa.w — *— **p— a— — a— wawMg**— aa**w— —
(New York, 1962) 27*
8individuals which the person responsible for key decisions seeks 
to have available to him and whose opinions he considers im­
portant in the decision-making process*
A final introductory remark is briefly to explain the 
organisation of this thesis* The reader has already been intro­
duced to the methods to be used, and the importance of this study 
from the author^ perspective. The first chapter will provide 
a conceptual framework with which to analyse the information 
presented in four case studies. The intent is that the reader 
will have a reasonable understanding of what happens to people 
in high threat situations characterised by compressed time, and 
can use this information to determine if the actions and state­
ments of the decision-makers (DM) surveyed in the case studied 
fit this pattern*
The four case studies are organized so as to provide 
sufficient background inf ormat i on to put the decision-maker *s 
actions in perspective. This is followed in each case by a 
detailed look at the crisis period itself and concluded with 
a section which discusses the conclusions which can be drawn 
from that individual case. The cases were chosen specifically 
to attempt to get different nationalities and general situa­
tions under study. In the work at hand, the studies include 
two American cases, one Chinese case, and one all-European case, 
covering a time span from 1914 to 1962.
9The final segment of the thesis presents a brief review 
of the propositions under investigation, the posited actions 
under stress situations, and the conclusions drawn in the indi­
vidual case studies* The results will then be collected and 
synthesized, and soma new working propositions derived*
A series of appendices have been provided for the con­
venience of the reader and contain information that is relevant 
to that particular case study but is too lengthy or awkward to 
fit conveniently into the body of the study* A detailed 
chronology is provided for all crisis periods, and a list of 
decision making units and/or maps are provided for several of 
the studies*
CHAPTER I
THREAT AND TIME PERCEPTION AND THE 
CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT
According to Henry Kissinger, "What is relevant for 
policy” in times of crisis "depends not only on academic
7
truths but also on what can be implemented under stress"« 
Observations by others who have experienced or studied in­
ternational crisis vary widely* Consider the following:
A decision-maker may, in a crisis, 
be able to work out easily and 
quickly what seems in normal times 
to both the "academic" scholar and 
the layman to be hypothetical, un- 
real, complex or otherwise difficult*
In every case, the decision (to go to 
war) is based upon a careful weighing 
of the chances and of anticipated con­
sequences * * * In no case is the de­
cision precipitated by emotional ten­
sions, sentimentality, crowd behavior, 
or other irrational motivations*^
7
Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" 
in James N* Rosenau (ed) International Politics and Foreign 
Policy (New York, 1969) 265*
8
Herman Kahn, On Escalation - Metaphors and Scenarios 
(New York, 1965) 38.
9
Theodore Abel, "The Element of Decision in the Pattern of 
Wa-r". American Sociological Review (April 1944) 855.
10
11
I saw first hand, during the long days, 
and nights of the Cuban crisis, how 
brutally physical and mental fatigue 
can numb the good sense as well as^Jhe 
senses of normally articulate men.
How dn individuals and groups respond to the pressures 
and tensions of crisis? Do we tend to approach such situa­
tions with high motivations, a keen sense of purpose, extra­
ordinary energy and enhanced creativity? Is necessity, as 
Kahn suggests, the mother of invention? Or, is our capabili­
ty for coping with the problem impared, perhaps even to the 
point suggested by Neustadt*s phrase "the paranoid reaction, 
characteristic of crisis behaviorn?^^
The answers to these questions are always important 
for persons who find themselves faced with crises. They 
assume extraordinary significance when the individuals are 
national leaders and the context is that of a contemporary 
international crisis: upon the ability of national leaders
to cope with situations of intense threat may depend on the 
lives of millions, if not the future of mankind. The purpose 
of this study is to attempt to improve on our present under-
Theodore Sorensen, Decision-Making at the White House 
(New York, 1967) 76.
Richard E. -Neustadt, Alliajnce Politics 
(New York, 1970) 116.
12
standing of national leaders in time of grave crisis.
The thrust of this initial chapter will be to provide 
the reader with a theoretical map, or model, against which 
the actions of the decision-makers in the following case 
studies can be more easily understood. In an effort to 
facilitate the logical development of the model, the chapter 
has been divided into five major sections. The first section 
introduces the idea of conflict as a phenomenon, in broad 
perspective, and identifies the level of analysis and ap­
proach to be used.
In the second section, the conflict environment is 
described, through a discussion of its major components; In 
the third section of the chapter, the role of perception in 
conflict is set forward.
With the general conflict environment and role of per­
ception thus developed, the fourth section provides a dis­
cussion of the two principle factors under investigation, 
threat and time. Decision-making behavior is here discussed 
in relation to the observed responses to high threat situa­
tions and restricted time (e.g., the phenomenon of pre- 
cicvcd reduction in available decision, time hereafter re­
ferred to as "time compression") and the effects of in­
creasing threat. The fifth and final section of the chapter 
is the discussion of the conclusions to be drawn. The major
points developed in the sections on conflict as a phenomenon, 
the conflict environment, the role of perception, and the 
effects of threat and time compression on crisis decision­
making are combined to provide the intellectual setting for 
the case studies which follow.
Conflict as a Phenomenon 
Conflict as a phenomenon, spans the breadth of human 
activity. It is frequently divisive and destructive, caus­
ing a deterioration of the relationships between man and wife
friends, families, groups and nations. But, conflict can also
12 . .
be positive. plays a role m  preventing stagnation,
stimulating interest, providing a medium for airing problems, 
and it may provide a way to test and assess one *s self. 
Politics, in its essence, is a conflict process by which 
limited resources are authoritatively allocated.
Certainly it is well beyond such an undertaking as the 
present one to attempt to discuss and analyze all aspects of 
conflict. It is generally accepted that while conflict in 
its many forms is deserving of further study, of particular 
importance in this age of intercontinental missiles and 
multiple warheads is the study of potentially destructive
14
conflict. Within this generally definable universe of 
conflict, attention will be focused on that part of the con­
flict environment that deals with crisis periods in inter­
national relations.
The choice of this restrictive definition has several 
roots. First, the study of conflict is in general a poorly 
defined enterprise; the more general one becomes, the more 
disagreement is encountered about definitions, appropriate 
boundaries, and analytical tools. Second, there is a grow­
ing body of literature that suggests that decision-making
almost always is done in small, ad hoc groups during times
13of great threat to important values or goals. Conse­
quently, the considerations of manageability, general agree­
ment on important factors, and availability of relevant in­
formation led to the selection of the level of analysis.
The conventional method used in a study of this nature 
is to adopt either an individual or systemic approach to 
ordering information. However, the perspective used here 
is a combination of both, attempting to take into considera-
13
See works of George Grosser or Charles F. Herman for 
further discussion.
14
James E. D0ugherty, Contending Theories of International 
Re Ip.tions (New York, 1971) 141*
15
tion individual traits such as temperament, physical
fatigue and experience coupled with organizational factors
such as intelligence estimates and advice of interested
agencies which act to set the range of acceptable choices
and alternative solutions. The section which follows will
combine the salient factors from these various approaches
and develope the setting, or environment, in which threat
and time compression will be studied
The Conflict Environment
The conflict environment which the decision-making
elites occupy is not primarily a physical situation (although
it may have some influence) but rather it is a mental and
procedural construct which encompasses the decision-making 
15group. Conflict characteristically occurs through a 
process of escalation which can be over an extended period 
or a very short one, and blatent or subtle. This can be a 
physical or psychological process, but its primary impact 
is on the state of men's minds; it is as Herman Kahn says 
a ,fcompet it ion in risk taking".1^ The purposes behind this 
escalation can be many. Generally they fall into motive
15
John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication 
(New York, 1969) 32.
16
Herman Kahn, On Escalation - Metaphors and Scenarios 
(New York, 1965) 3.
16
categories, such as an intentional show or wrecklessness
(intended to cause caution on the opponent1s part), a
demonstration committment, or preparations for escalation
17
by the opponent*
However, escalation is not in and of itself conflict* 
Certain relationships characterize the conflict environment# 
Ole Holsti suggests that conflict occurs either from en­
croachment on another nation or its preserves, or from
18
aggravated competition between two expanding national units* 
The latter can occur either in the form of a physical effort 
to control or from an attempt to gain psychological/ideo­
logical dominance in a given area. Obviously, these con­
flicts can occur at different levels of intensity and are 
frequently a nirrture of economic, ideological, political and 
military factors* Resulting strategies and modes of resolu­
tion may shift as one or the other basic sources of power
19
becomes salient•
An environment which is characterized by conflict 
tends also to have certain characteristics which define it* 
Karl Dcutsch classifies them as: (1) idcntification of issues,
17
lb id *
1 9
Ke nnet h W . BOu Id ing , Conflict and Defense
17
(2) perception of threat and inadequate time, (3) a lack
of clear territorial limits, (4) communications problems,
(5) incomplete information, and finally,(6) willingness to 
20
use force*
Identification of Issues 
The process of identifying the central issues is a 
deceptive one* It is closely related with, and, the major 
determinant of, a nation*s willingness to go to war* John 
Burtonnotec  ^that it cannot be assumed that the issues be­
lieved to be those in dispute are in fact the ones that
21
caused the active conflict* Normally conflict occurs after 
an escalation process in which issues are rarely clearcut 
and well defined, rather they tend to go through a sublima­
tion and transfer process by which they become intertwined 
with symbology of great emotional appeal within that society. 
Whatever the issues may have been, the conflict becomes one 
between the "good1* (our nation) attempting to stand up for 
what is "right” against the "bad” (the other side)* It is 
frequently the case that the event that leads to open
20
Clagett G* Smith, Conflict Resolution: Contribution of
the Social Sciences (North Dakota, 1971) 32*
21
John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication
(New York, 1969) 24*
18
22violence is just the one that triggered the loaded gun* 
Certainly nobody would claim that all Europe so loved Arch­
duke Ferdinand that they were willing to risk their very 
existance for his revenge, or that America felt such a strong 
bond of kinship with the South Koreans that they were bound 
to come to the rescue*
The Perception of Threat and Inadequate Time 
The perception of threat, and the perception of inade­
quate time (time compression) are intimately and subtly re­
lated to the identification of issues, discussed above*
While the effects of threat and time on decision-makers will 
be presented in some detail in section four of this chapter, 
it is appropriate at this point to identify the central 
nature of threat in the conflict environment* It can 
reasonably be stated that a sense of threat is a necessary 
condition for a conflict environment to exist.
As the issues are identified by decision-makers, and 
various factors of the conflict environment come into play, 
they interact in the formation of a set of perceptions of 
the relationships between rival decision groups* These 
perceptions, though they may first be held tentatively, 
will come to be accepted as a true reflection of what is
22
John W. Burton, Conflict and Communication
(New York, 1969) 24*
19
actually occurring. The sense, or level, of threat con­
tained in these perceptions will directly determine the 
priority that that problem recieves among the decision-making 
group. Additionally, it appears that as the perceived threat 
increases, some of the normal problem solving capabilities 
become less effective. The perceived threat, then, acts to 
alter the decision-making situation. It acts, in fact, as 
a basic determinate in defining what types of problem 
solving techniques can be or will be used.
The sense of inadequate time being available to 
accomplish a given task, or "time compression", is also 
involved in this process of successively less effective 
decision-making. As the level of threat rises, time both 
becomes more important, and is perceived as being less and 
less adequate. A more detailed discussion will be presented 
below, but suffice it to say here that time compression is 
closely related to increased threat perception and effects 
the attitude of decision-makers involved.
Territorial Limits
As used by Deutsch, territorial limits can be physical, 
psychological or ideological. These territories, or spheres 
of influence, have roughly defined outer limits which fre­
quently do not coincide with the conception of other states 
as to where these boundaries are. The psychological
"territory” Is closely related to the concept of "critical 
boundary" which will be explained further on in the chapter. 
Basically, it refers to the self-conception of that country1 
appropriate place and role among nations. An example of 
this might be Britain*s self image as "keeper of the balance 
and guarantor of safe passage on the oceans of the world 
prior to World War I. Ideological territory refers to the 
position along the continuum between the extremes of politi­
cal posture and a struggle between two nations to claim the 
leadership in any given direction. The ideological conflict 
between China and Russia during the last 20 years is an 
example of this•
Communication Problems 
Communication problems as an element of the conflict 
environment is significant enough a problem that a separate 
section on the topic will be presented later in the chapter. 
For that reason no more will be said about it at this point 
other than to indicate its role in the conflict process.
That role is to make accurate gauging of the opponent more 
difficult, consequently making appropriate responses to the 
opponent’s actions a matter of great uncertainty.
Incomplete Information 
The next characteristic of the conflict environment
21
23
identified by Deutsch was incomplete information. John W. 
Burton, in his book Conflict and Communications, noted 
during periods of crisis and attempts at crisis management, 
that by the nature of the limited time available, decision­
makers are characteristically forced to make decisions on 
information, they know is incomplete and only partially 
verified. Particularly since World War II? the mere volume 
itself of communications has become a tremendous problem. 
Messages are inexplainably delayed (as with several of the 
key messages in Korea in 1950) or cross messages from the 
opposing decision-makers (as in WQrld War I). One of the 
great concerns of the Kennedy decision group was a fear of 
the Russians discovering U-2 flights over Cuba. They were
forced to plan under the continuous realization that their
24
available time could be cut to zero at any moment.
A moment of reflection on the environment and chara­
cteristics above, and the framework these create, immediately 
point out that the concept of conflict environment is by no 
means a simple nor very straight forward one. Conflict may
23
Richard C. Snyder, Foreign Policy Decision-Making 
(New York, 1962) 237.
24
J* L. Aranguren, Human Coinraunicat1on 
(New York, 1967) 65.
22
exist in ideological, economic, military or political
25
spheres, or any combination of them simultaneously. 
Additionally, the relative importance of any one area can, 
and will, vary at different times depending on its saliency
to the decision-making unit*
With the overview of conflict and the conflict en­
vironment also complete, there remains one factor which 
needs to be discussed briefly before proceeding into an 
investigation of the role of perception in international 
crisis decision-making* This last factor which is germane 
to the discussion is the willingness of a nation to 
escalate and/or resort to violence and the process of 
identifying issues involved in a given conflict situation*
Willingness To Use Force 
The final consideration, that of willingness to use 
the force available, is a problem which is extremely 
critical to the calculations of all decision groups as 
they approach the point of war or no war. Willingness to 
go to war is a very complex phenomenon and almost wholly a 
product ox that particular culture; the nation’s critical 
boundaries are intimately involved in this process* The
2 5
Lincoln Bloomfield, Amelia Liess, Controlling Small Wars: 
A Strategy for the 1970’s (New York, 1960) 16*
23
Americans are probably the best example today of a nation
with tremendous war potential and an almost impenetrable
fog around what issues will and will not cause a violent
reaction. Certainly the Russians and North Koreans had
every reasonable expectation that the United States would
not put its own armed forces in the balance for a country
it had already said would have to depend on itself and was
26
declared to be outside the US Asian defense perimeter.
The Role Of Perception In Conflict 
It is appropriate to note at this juncture that this 
work will deal strictly with the perception of threat, and 
perceptions of compressed time, rather than attempt to 
determine if there actually was a high threat situation, 
and, or if there actually was adequate time. This position 
is both justifiable and appropriate in that the decision­
makers studied reacted to the situation as they percaived 
27it to be; whether their perceptions accurately reflected 
the real situation is of no particular consequence here.
This section will provide the reader a discussion of the
26
Carl Berger, The Korean Knots A Military-Political 
History (Philadelphia, 1968) 104.
27
Charles F. Hermann, International Crisis: Insights from
Behavioral Research (New York, 1972) 64.
24
role of perception and the major factors that influence
the perception development process*
Kenneth Boulding provides support for this approach
to crisis investigation in his statement on the basic condi-
28
tions that must exist for conflxct to occur* These basic 
requirements are stated to be:
1* Both organizations must be present in the 
images of the decision-makers of the other
Arri'n r>“i + *i or* .
2. Decisions on the part of decision-makers 
must affect both organizations in value- 
significant ways*
3. Decisions must affect the image of the 
other organization so that the second 
organization is affected unfavorably*
Obviously Mr. Boulding1s emphasis is on the psycho­
logical perception of the situation* While some portions 
of reality may well affect any decision that an individual 
makes, it cannot affect the original decision process if 
the decision-maker did not perceive this reality or perceive 
it as relevant*
28
Kenneth E* Boulding, Conflict and Defense
(New York, 1962) 151*
25
While it is almost impossible to identify for any 
specific individual the exact composition of his perceptual 
set, it is possible to identify the major factors which 
appear to influence the decision-making process, particu­
larly those effecting high level decisions. Although the 
influence any one factor has on an individuals perception 
may vary, it will be comprised of stimuli falling generally 
into the categories of (1) culture, (2) communications,
(3) spiral of effect, and (■4-) information. An additional 
factor, critical boundary, is included in this discussion 
as a particularly useful tool in understanding this 
specialized and narrow segment of perception development.
Culture
A factor of tremendous significance in considering
og
perceptions in culture* Ail incoming stimuli are 
evaluated in terms of the reference images characteristic 
to the society of the receiving individual. Consequently, 
the effort to convey a particular message between persons 
of different cultures and heritage becomes almost unattain­
able when placed in a conflict environment in which there 
is no direct communications (a characteristic of virtually
29
Bernard Berelson, Content Analysis in Communications
Research, (New York, 1971) 68.
26
30
all conflict situations which led to war). Studies have
shown that information is limited by the conceptual frame -
work of the receiving decision-maker, the tendency being to
receive, select, or reject, information as it conforms to
31
preformed belief/value patterns. As Heinz Fischer noted:
"The extent to which individuals/groups understand each
other is a function of how much their world views and frames
32
of reference overlap*1. This problem of common reference 
also manifests itself in the great difficulty that is ex­
perienced even in developing a common "yardstick,f by which 
each party can measure its respective power positions in a 
conflict. Such measurement devices (which allow compara­
tive measurements) tend to appear only in the resolution 
phases of conflict•
Communications
A very complex field of study intimately connected 
with perception as developed above is that of communications
and in particular what John Burton and Richard Merritt call
30
Ibid.
31
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"effective communication"* Burton posits that whether a 
communication makes for harmony or conflict depends in 
large part on its content and perception of that content*
He defines effective communication as "the deliberate con­
veying and accurate receiving and interpretations of what
33
was intended to be conveyed". Standing as a formidable 
bloc to efforts to accomplish this are a host of difficul­
ties, most connected with what is called the cognitive
34
organization or process. This is the system of cate­
gories for classifying and ordering the events of exper­
ience and language development and acts to restrict our 
understanding of the symbolic meaning of words.
An important facet of this process of communications
35
is that of feedback. This mechanism is the means by which
the decision-makers will evaluate the actual, or perceived, 
effect of its previous decisions in relation to what it had 
attempted to do. The ability of a given DM unit to
33
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accomplish what it set out to do will be in part a func­
tion of how well it is able to interpret this feedback 
information.
Spiral of Effect
The impact of perception, culture, and stress on the
communications process has been studied by many prominent
researchers in the field of conflict environment. In
Conflict and Defense. Boulding discusses what is known as
36
the Richardson Process. This is a process by which a 
movement by one side so changes the field of the second 
side that he must move causing the first to move again, 
etc. This process is also called the "Spiral of effect" 
and this term will generally be used in this paper.
An excellent example of the spiral of effect is the 
naval construction race between Britain and Germany at the 
turn of the 20th Century. Germany, with its "Copenhagen 
complex" desired a fleet adequate to cause Britain to think 
twice before launching a surprise attack (also called the 
"risk fleet" concept). Britain, however, perceived this 
as an insidious building program intended to wrest control 
of the seas from Britain and put England at an enormous
36
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disadvantage* Britain*s response was to increase her own 
building program, particularly in the Dreadnaught class, 
thus aggravating and, to the German mind, substantiating 
Germany's tears, generating greater efforts on her part. 
This spiral of effect can, and has, led to disasterous re­
sults, if not effectively throttled. Richard Merritt's
mediated stimulus - response paradigm of the process pro-
37
vides a useful model of this phenomenon:
STATE A STATE B
R S R S
Percep, of jstmnt of A's Percept• of Strants of B'sj
B's attit.&j Plans & In- R Behav.>S A's attit.& Plans & In- | R
I tent Output tent. j 1
Behav. twds? Twds B Behav. twds Twds A j
A B
Behavioral Cutout
R = Response S = Stimulus
Information
Another aspect of importance in a conflict situation
is the volume of information involved. Heise and Miller
found that "the performance of a small group depends upon the
channels of communications open to its members, the task which
38
the group must handle and the stress under which they work".
37Richard L« Merritt, C ommunications in International 
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As the volume of information directed at the decision­
making group rises, the search for information within the 
communication system tends to become less thorough, selec­
tivity becomes greater. Unpleasant information and that
which does not support the group's preferences is likely not
39
to be accepted unless the factual support is overwhelming.
Holsti observed in his work on the communications 
process in stress situations that communications increased 
during crisis in an uneven manner - intra-alliance communi­
cations increased significantly while inter-alliance de­
creased. Also, as perceived threat rose, both incoming and 
outgoing messages reflected increasingly simple and stereo­
typed assessments of the situation. This in turn caused
the number of alternative solutions considered to be de- 
40
creased. The hunt for alternatives was also found to be 
restricted by tendencies for decision groups to get smaller 
and technological factors to decrease the objective decision 
time •
The Critical Boundary 
Another concept which is closely related to those
39
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developed above, and which is useful as a cognitive or
ordering device for understanding the actions of such
nations as Communist China and Great Britain, is that of
41
"Critical Boundary". This is a verbalization of the idea 
found in the writings of many authors in the field that 
every major nation has a physical or psychological boundary 
or series of boundaries that, when penetrated, causes an 
increasingly disruptive reaction in the country whose 
boundaries are crossed, until such a point is reached that 
the violated nation feels compelled to go to war. The final 
(interior) boundary*s protection is seen as an absolute 
imperative. No resource is left unused in the effort to 
keep any outside force from penetrating or establishing in­
fluence over it.
These boundaries are frequently a product of many 
influences, including tradition, the state of the military 
art and public opinion. Critical boundaries may or may not 
coincide with the actual physical boundaries of a nation/ 
state. Two good examples of critical boundaries which 
extend beyond physical boundaries are Britain prior to 
World War I in France, and the Chinese Peoples Republic in
41
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Korea in 1950« Many of the documents released after the 
First WQrld War showed that the key British decision­
makers considered it unacceptable to have the north coast 
of France under the control of any power inimical to British 
sea power* Britains committments and "informal" (and secret)
talks between 1907 and 1912 were precisely aimed at ensuring
42
a British presence in the area if need be*
In the case of China, its extended critical boundary
43
appears to run somewhere through the middle of North Korea* 
Although the sense of "natural" borders extending beyond 
their current boundaries has long been a Chinese belief, an 
exact demarcation of this boundary was not even clear to 
the Chinese themselves until the US First Cavalry Division 
prepared to cross the 38th Parallel*
This last case points out one of the insidious quali­
ties of this phenomenon; it is almost never commonly de­
clared and may not be more than a vague formulation for the 
formulation for the appropriate decision-making elites
42
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themselves* As a consequence, the ability of the oppos­
ing decision-makers to anticipate the psychological dis­
ruption that will occur and alter its own actions is 
virtually nil* Past experience seems to support the idea 
that one group becomes aware that it has penetrated this
boundary only by the violent reaction it tends to percipi-
45
tate after already having done so*
The Effects Of Threat And Time On Decision-Making
With the broad areas we call the conflict environment 
and the role of perception in conflict now discussed, and 
the significant factors relevant to this research which act 
on and within it identified, it is time to develop the role 
of threat perception and compressed time in crisis decision­
making* For the purposes of this discussion, the definition 
to be used for threat perception will be that of Charles F* 
Hermann* He defined perceived threat as: "the degree of 
anticipated harm to the nation observed in both the seman­
tics of crisis communications and in the character of situa-
46
tional fears"* It is necessary to say a word about
45
Ole R* Holsti, Crisis - Escalation - War 
(London, 1972) 29.
46
Charles F* Hermann, International Crisis: Insights from 
Behavioral Research (New York, 1972) 170.
34
semantics; with the diversity of approaches to the study
of conflict, it is not surprising that different authors
use different terras to describe the same general phenomenon*
In the author * s research and in quotes in this work, the
terras "stress", and in some cases "emotion11 have been used
47
as a synonym for "threat"as used here*
Response To Threat Situations
George Grosser in his book, The Threat of Impending
Disaster * identified the sequence a decision-maker goes
48
through as he becomes cognizant of a threat* Research
has shown that an individual or group will not allow itself
to stay in a situation of high stress (threat), but will
utilize a series of escalating defensive mechanisms to at-
49
tempt to settle the problem. Grosser posits a three-stage 
process by which a threat situation is defined in a manner
that is compatable with the receiver’s cognitive organization* 
This series of mental processes serves to: (1) verify the
47
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aspects of the threat (nature, probability of becoming
more severe, locus, timing, and severity)j (2) to authentic
cate it (definition, distortion of image, and selection);
and (3) elaborate it (manageability, escapability, post-
ponability, survivability and tolerance to it)* The threat
as thus conceptulized is then analyzed in relation to the
importance of the threatened value or goal; that is to
determine if it is a "shell" (relatively unimportant) or
50
"core” (very important) value*
Effects Of Increasing Threat
Others working in this field point out that stress, or
threat, at low levels of intensity, have positive effects
on and indeed appear to be a necessary precondition to
51
individual and organizational problem-solving* For simple 
problems of a quantitative nature, moderate amounts of stress 
can produce increased output for limited periods of time* 
Unfortunately, important political issues nearly always are 
marked by complexity, ambiguity, and the lack of stability, 
and usually demand responses that are qualitative rather than
50
George H* Grosser, The Threat Of Impending Disaster 
(Massachusetts, 1964) 106*
51
Ole R* Holsti, Crisis - Escalation - War 
(London, 1972) 11*
36
quantitative# It is exactly this qualitative ability that
is most likely to degenerate under increasing stress or
52
perceived threat.
Most research findings suggest a curvilinear relation­
ship between threat and performance; a moderate level helps, 
while increasing the level eventually begins to disrupt the
decision process until finally it breaks down almost 
53
completely#
A series of landmark investigations were conducted by 
Postman and Bruner on the effects of high threat on per­
ception# Their conclusion was that
"Perceptual behavior is disrupted, 
becoming less wall controlled than 
under normal conditions, and hence 
less adaptive# The major dimensions 
of perceptual functioning are af­
fected: selection of perceptions 
from a corap lex field becomes less 
adequate and sense is less well 
differentiated from nonsense; there 
is maladaptive accentuation in the 
direction of aggression and escape, 
untested hypotheses are fixated 
recklessly” • 5z-
52
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In concert with these findings, a host of researchers 
have identified the following effects of high-stress (threat) 
on dec is i on -maker s s
1* Increased random behavior*
2. Increased rate of error*
3. Regression to simpler modes of responses*
4* Problem - solving rigidity*
5* Diminished focus of attention.
6* Reduced ability to discriminate the dangerous 
from the trivial*
7. Reduced scope of complexity of perceptual activities.
8. Loss of abstract abilities*
9* Loss of complexity in dimensions of political 
cognition*
10. Lowering of tolerance for ambiguity.
11* Tendency of both decision-making groups to have 
mirror-images of their opponents options vs. their own.
The Effects Of Time Perception
Closely allied with the phenomenon of high threat, and 
the other major factor to be investigated in this work, 
is the perception of the adequacy or inadequacy of time
55
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greater discussion*
38
(time compression)* As with threat perception, time per­
ception is a critical factor. Generally investigators 
have found that the ability to judge time becomes impaired
under high stress - as the threat is perceived to become
56
greater, time appears to move faster* Several of the case
studies to be investigated here are particularly striking
examples of this manifestation. Additionally coordinated
long range planning is conspicuously not present in high
threat situations as the immediate threat is percieved to
be of such over-powering importance that long range consid-
57
erations appear to have little or no relevance. Other 
manifestations of time pressure identified by several re­
searchers are s
1. Increased propensity to rely on stereotypes.
2. Problem-solving becomes progressively more
disrupted.
3. Focus of attention is narrowed.
4. Impedes use of available information.
5. Impedes exploration of alternatives.
6. Creates early group agreement.
56
Paul H. Conn, Conflict and Communications 
(New Ycrk, 1972) 117.
57
Ole R. Ho 1st i, C r 1 s i s -Es c a 1 at i on - War 
(L0ndon, 1972) 16*
39
As Holsti noted in concluding his discussion of the above 
subjects in his book CRISIS - ESCALATION - WAR, Evidence 
suggests the paradox that as the intensity of a crisis in­
creases, it makes creative policy making both more impor-
58
tant and less likely”• This author tends to agree*
It may be of some assistance at this point to depict
graphically the relationship between high threat and time
compression and individual and decision group reaction.
The relationship on the individual level can be depicted as 
59follows:
Chart on next page
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Individual Reaction to High Threat
disruptive %  
stress
reduction in 
cue awareness
rigidity in 
perceptions
rigidity in cog­
nitive process
+ repetition of prior responses 
regarded as successful
- alternatives available to 
self and allies
+ simple behavior
- comprehension of tacit 
bargaining moves
reduced time 
DersDactive
S'
+ zero-sum interpretation 
of situation
^ - consideration of domestic 
political consequences
shift in priority of 
objectives
Source: Ole B. Holsti, Crisis-Escalation - War
Plus and minus signs indicate positive and negative relation­
ships, respectively for both diagrams* By way of comparison,
the organizational response to high threat/time compression
60
appears in the following manner*
See chart on next page
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Conclusion
With the major theoretical sections of the chapter 
now exposed to the reader, it is appropriate at this 
juncture to take a moment to reflect on the most important 
elements of the model as developed. As stated in the intro­
ductory remarks, the chapter was divided into five major 
sections. The theoretical portions of this chapter dealt 
with conflict as a phenomena, the conflict environment, the 
role of perception, and the effects of high threat and time 
compression on decision-makers.
The objective of the author in presenting the factors 
selected and the order of presentation was to provide the 
reader first with a general overview of the environment in 
which the decision-maker characteristically finds himself.
It was seen that the individual(s) concerned must deal with 
a host of extraordinary influences in processing information 
and attempting to understand the situation they face. Fre­
quently even the most fundamental problem, that of identify­
ing the issues in dispute and their importance to the 
various competing decision-making groups, is itself not 
clearly resolved. Multiplying this sense of uncertainty 
in international crises are many factors which influence 
the decisions-makers in both manifest and latent ways.
43
The decision group is directly confronted with the 
necessity of dealing with the considerable problems of 
attempting to communicate effectively their intentions and 
properly deciphering their opponents actions* Additionally, 
the type, speed, and volume of communications itself creates 
considerable problems for the decision-makers attempting to 
cope with a crisis.
Intimately tied with these manifest problems of crisis 
periods are several factors which effect the decision pro­
cess in more subtle, less well defined ways. A vague sense 
of "proper11 national territorial limits, which is almost 
never articulated, combines with the willingness of decision 
groups to use force to provide additional factors which 
become part of the total environment acting upon, and being 
acted upon, by the decision-makers in question.
It can readily be seen that the general setting in 
which crisis decisions must be made is ill-defined and con­
tinually changing. How individuals react to these changes 
was shown to be immediately related to how that change was 
perceived by the receiver. The intensity of threat per­
ceived has a direct effect on the sense of critical boundary 
and the extent of the effects of the spiral of effect 
phenomena. These factors tend to combine with the other 
influences characteristically present in the crisis situa-
44
ation to create a sense of rising threat to important 
values and perceived inadequate time in which to deal sat­
isfactorily with the threat presented.
Once the reader had been introduced to the conflict 
environment in general and has seen the importance of per­
ception in its processes, the hypothesized effects of threat 
and time can then be considered in somewhat greater detail. 
This section provided the model of how people in decision­
making groups in high stress situations tend to react 
according to the theory to be investigated here. It was 
seen that they are expected not to allow themselves to stay 
in this situation for extended periods. As stress increases 
qualitative abilities are expected to diminish, the individ­
uals concerned may become less adaptive, have-greater 
difficulty with complex issues, and tend to accept untested 
hypotheses. Characteristically their actions may be ex­
pected to show increased rates of error, problem solving 
rigidity, and a reduced ability to discriminate the danger­
ous from the trivial.
Time compression in this theory, is seen to have 
similar but separately identifiable traits of its own. Close­
ly related to high threat situations, the decision-makers 
involved may be expected to sense that their reaction time 
is inadequate and that time is moving more rapidly than
45
normal. Long range planning our theory would suggest, is 
generally not considered. The focus of attention in time 
compression situations we would expect to narrow, impeding 
efforts to explore alternatives. These forces according to 
the theory, tend to move decision groups towards early con­
sensus on a limited number of possibilities or on a specific 
choice.
In sum the notion under investigation here is that 
threat perception and time compression have significant 
effects on decision-making groups in their efforts to react 
to situations in a conflict environment. The reader should 
now have before him a mental construct of the factors thought 
to be characteristically present in a crisis environment, and 
how individuals, if they are under the influence of per­
ceived high threat and/or time compression, will be expected 
to react. In the following chapters the reader will be pre­
sented with a series of four case studies involving differ­
ent nations and decision-making groups under crisis condi­
tions. The reader is asked to keep in mind the character­
istic actions and attitudes of those under high stress 
conditions put forward in this theoretical framework, and 
determine from the material presented in the case studies 
which follow, if the three propositions offered for investi­
gation stand up to the light of actual experience.
CHAPTER II
EUROPE GOES TO WAR: 1914 CRISIS
At approximately 10:45 am on 28 June 1914, Archduke 
Francis Fredinand, heir apparent to the throne of Austria- 
Hungary, was struck down by an assassin's bullet in the pro­
vincial capitol of Sarajevo* This singular act of political 
violence by an unknown Serbian nationalist against an unpopular 
member of the house of Hapsburg was to unleash bitterness, 
hatred, and fears accumulating since 1870* The resulting con­
flagration was to spread with amazing speed to engulf all of 
Europe in war in the period of one month* Before the last shot
was fired and the last bugle sounded taps, some 26 million men 
61
lay dead; a generation of young men were gone* This was to 
be the most destructive war the world has known*
How does such a tragedy happen? Why do presumably sane, 
rational statesman who have dealt with crisis after crisis, 
many of them, on their merits, more threatening than that of
61
Edward Stillman, The Politics of Hysteria: Sources of 20th
Century Conflict (New York, 1965) 118.
46
47
Sarajevo,suddenly fail to stop the headlong plunge into a war 
that all know would have no victors - only greater and lesser 
losers? It would certainly be simplistic to say that any single 
factor or group of factors can explain a multi-faceted phenom­
enon such as this* It is, however, possible to identify the 
more salient forces acting on these statesmen for a more de­
tailed investigation. With this in mind, it will be the purpose 
of this chapter to take the concepts, relationships and working 
hypotheses regarding threat and time perception developed in 
the previous section and use them to analyze in some detail 
the events occurring in Europe from 28 June 1914 to 4 August 
1914.
It became readily apparent to the researcher that the 
amount of information available on the origins of the First 
World War is only slightly less vast than the war itself. In 
order to accommodate the purpose of this study it was necessary 
to be highly selective as to the extent and depth of the mater­
ial to be presented. Because of the restricted space available, 
the period prior to June of 1914 is covered only in highlight. 
However, it is the opinion of the researcher that although none 
of the period between 1870 and 1914 is discussed in great depth, 
that the information presented is adequate to provide the 
central facets of the historical "definition of the situation" 
needed to interpret events of the period in question.
In an effort to develop a coherent picture of the various
48
forces acting upon the major participants during that fateful 
period in the summer of 1914, this chapter will address the sub­
ject by using two different ordering devices* The period from 
1870 to 1914 will be divided topically to discuss underlying 
causes, secret alliances, and Balkan problems* The events from 
the Archdukevs assassination on 28 June through England's dec­
laration of war on 4 August will be surveyed chronologically by 
country* The first section will be so organized as to facili­
tate conceptulization of the major factors comprising the 
decision-makers field of perceptions, while the latter will 
assist the demonstration of the role of threat, time, and altern­
atives considered during this crisis period*
The underlying causes of any modern conflict are a complex 
conglomeration of numerous factors, some of which are more
important than others* Sidney Fay divides the most important
62
of those governing World War I into five major groupings*
These are: Militarism, Nationalism, Economic Imperialism, the 
Newspaper Press, and Secret Alliances*
MILITARISM: The importance and impact of militarism is
closely related to the system of secret treaties that
62
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characterised the period prior to World War I# "Militarism” 
is a vaguely used term, but does include three definite con­
cepts: 1) the dangerous and burdensome mechanism of great
standing Armies and large Navies with attendent evils of es­
pionage , suspicion, fear, and hatred; 2) the existence of a 
powerful class of military and naval officers headed by the 
General staffs, who tend to dominate civilian authorities dur­
ing times of crisis; a form of military "culture” - of a kind 
which characterized Prussia prior to the First World War, but 
to some extent every military elite of the period* This cul­
ture amounted to a form of military social Darwinism in which
machismo, strict discipline, and caste typified the unwritten
63
but generally accepted "rules of the game"*
Two key indicators of militarism were increased spending 
and size* This became the norm for all European armies follow­
ing the Franco-Prussian war* The proportions of this can 
readily b 2 seen by a comparison of the per capita expenditure
on arms at the beginning and end of this period* Expenditures
64
for the major powers were as follows:
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Nat ion GB FR RUSS IT GBR AOS
1870 $ 3.54 2,92 1.28 1,38 1.28 1.08
1914 $ 8,23 7.07 3.44 3.16 8.19 3.10
(NOTE: Figures adjusted for inflation)
The arguments presented by the military and their supporters 
in all countries are a classic example of the r,spiral of effect" 
discussed in the previous chapter - each saw the others in­
creased armaments as a "threat to world peace" and demanded 
parallel increases to "maintain security". This pressure for 
expansion was fanned by the alliance system; both by the per­
ceived threat of the Triple Alliance of being surrounded, and 
by actions such as France's massive loans to Russia for strate- 
g ic rai Iroad construct ion ,
It was seen as the supreme duty of all armies to be ready
65to defend the state by force of arms at any moment. The 
direct consequence of this imperative was the constant pre­
occupation of all General Staff's to be ready to make or meet 
attack in the shortest possible time. To do this, extremely 
detailed and extensive plans were made and yearly revised to 
provide minute and detailed plans for the total process of 
mobilization, movement to the frontier and frequently initiation
65
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of an attack. Military officers generally held the view that 
it was advantageous to take the offensive and get to the enemy 
before he could complete his own mobilization; forcing him to 
fight in his territory. Given the tremendous complexity of these 
mobilization plans and the idea that any effort to stop them 
once started left that party open to easy attack, coupled with 
the relative parity, except for Russia, of mobilization times 
which were normally about two weeks, the critical nature of time 
becomes immediately obvious. Sidney Fay stated the essence of 
this critical point when he pointed out that "a general mobili­
zation, according to prevailing military opinion, actually did 
make war inevitable. It was a process virtually impossible to 
halt once begun . . .  It is always at a crisis, precisely when 
it is most difficult for diplomats to keep their heads clear and 
their hands free, that the military leaders exert their influ­
ence to hasten the decision of war, or get the upper hand alto­
gether”.
This was to prove to be one of the two great evils of 
militarism. The other was only to be seen as war was close at 
hand. This was the fact that these military plans and treaties 
were made in great secrecy, always unknown by the public, and
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only partially known and understood by the rest of government* 
Sidney Fay cites Saznov's failure to comprehend the impossi­
bility of partial mobilization and Bethmann-Hollweg*s failure 
to understand the implications of the Schlieffen plan as pain­
ful examples of this phenomenon*
NATIONALISM: The impact of nationalism on the inter­
national environment provided some of the basic underlying, if 
not immediate, reasons for the war* In its chronic form it 
appeared as Pan-Slavismf Pan-German ism and Revanche* It acted 
particularly to precondition the decision-makers in all countries 
towards interpretation of incoming stimuli to agree with pre­
formed negative views of the adversary* This was a central 
factor in Russo-Austrian affairs and probably was the primary
moving force in the Balkan situation that led directly to the
67
immediate occasion of the world war* It was through this 
highly negative perceptual "lense" that the continuously worsen­
ing balance of power for the Triple Alliance after 1911 was 
68viewed* The obvious conclusion was that, given the polar 
perceptive sets of the various nations, the situation could not 
help but get progressively more dangerous for the Central Powers*
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BCONOMIC IMPERIALISM: Although not as central an issue
as the two discussed above, the political-economic colonization 
process did have an effect, particularly on the attitudes of the 
average citizen* The last quarter of the 19th century saw a 
marked increase in new colonies* With the emergence of Germany 
in the race for colonies, and the reduced number of desirable 
areas still open for colonization, national interests and pres­
tige of the major colonizers*
These imperialist activities and the continous friction
that was so much a part of it contributed to the environment
which made war possible* The major effects of economic imperia-
69
lism on pre-war attitudes were three in number* Tnese were:
It 1) provided ample verification that military might was a 
necessity and strengthened the ”might makes right” faction;
2) acted to further estrange England and Germany and push 
England towards de facto alliance with France; and, most import­
antly, 3) requirements to protect the new possessions were an 
important force in the development and increasing pace of the 
arms race*
NEWSPAPER PRESS: The true effect of the newspapers is
not, even today, very well understood* Universally the press
69
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tended to inflame nationalist feelings, misrepresent the situa­
tion in favor of its country and supressed factors which favored 
70peace. Numerous efforts to establish better relations were 
seriously hampered by the jingoistic attitude of the press. It 
was not unknown for "newspaper wars1' to be conducted between 
rival country papers. Fay comments: "between 1908 and 1914 
there was no single topic which was so frequently a subj'ect of 
complaint and discussion between the representatives of Germany 
and Russia as the maligning influence of the Pan-Slav and Pan-
71
German press in stirring up bad blood between the two countries".
The newspapers played another role; they were an excellent, 
and oft-used, disclaimer against some requested action by 
another country. "Public opinion would not allow it", proved 
to be a combination of convenient myth and troublesome fact.
The location along this continuum depended on the country in 
question, with England to one end and Russia to the other.
SECRET AJLLIANCES: The last of the major factors is one
of the two major determinants of July 1914. Europe had long 
been characterized by continuous alliance making, breaking and
70
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modification* In order to keep the subject from exploding be­
yond the proportions of the purpose of this paper only those 
alliances of some significance will be identified* The normal 
convention of starting with the results of the Franco-Prussian 
war of 1870 will be followed here*
In general it can be said that the alliance system as it
72
evolved was the single greatest cause of the war* It divided
Europe into two armed camps each of which initially acted to
restrict actions of its members but additionally guaranteed that
when war did come all would be involved* Each group felt bound
both by treaty and by fear to uphold its coalition lest it lose
power in the precarious balance that existed* In reading the
documents from each of the governments one is struck by the
constant reference to the need to maintain solidarity of
alliances* The comment of Sir Eyre Crowe early in the crisis
is a good example of this attitude* "What ever we may think of
the merits of the Austrian charges against Serbia • • • the
bigger cause of Triple Alliance v* Triple Entente is definitely
engaged • • • Our interests are tied up with France and Russia
73in this struggle • ♦
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1870-1890; The period from 1870 to 1890 was dominated by
the implications of the French defeat in 1871 at the hands of a
new German nation. The two over-riding factors were first the
loss by France of the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, and second,
the change in the balance of power in which France was to be
diplomatically isolated for this 20 year period through the
skillful maneuvers of Bismarck. The first factor was to prove
to be the more important in that the city of Strassbourg, which,
while legally now a German city, was in spirit and mind still
avidly French. Around this issue the revanche phenomenon
coalesced; "the wound that would not heal"*
All of the treaties of this twenty year period (1870-1890)
were combinations of Germany with Russia and sometimes Austria*
The results of an abortive effort by Russia to create a "Greater
Bulgar" and gain access to the Bosporus Straights forced Russia
to accept the Congress of Berlin and ended the Emperor League
of 1872-1878 with an estrangement between Germany and Russia.
As a consequence of perceived threat of military action, Germany
created the Austro-German Alliance of 1879. This treaty was to
become the bedrock of the German diplomacy until the collapse
74
of the Empire in 1918.
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1890-1907: The period of 1890 to 1907 was ushered in by
a dramatic switch in the balance of power with the Franco-
Russian entente of 1891. Many reasons prompted this combine
but most basically were the fear of being isolated, (feeling
themselves to be isolated and threatened by Germany) and the
fear of an expanded German economic and military presence, both
on the continent and in colonial areas.
The first step in changing this entente into an alliance
occurred in 1894 with the agreement between French and Russian
military representatives that "the two armies would have to
act simultaneously in case of an attack from which they both
75had to fear the consequences". The key factor of the agree­
ment was that mobilisation was to be considered the same as a 
declaration of war. General Boisdeffe (French representative 
at the treaty signing) said to the Czar the day after the 
signing: "mobilization is the declaration of war. To mobilize 
is to oblige your neighbor to do the same . . .  it is placing 
oneself in the situation of an individual who, with a pistol
in his pocket, should let his neighbor put a weapon to his
76
forehead without drawing his own".
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During this period England had remained in "splendid 
isolation" and was relatively uninvolved in the intrigues of 
the alliance process* However by 1898 it was becoming pain­
fully obvious to the British leaders that isolation was becom­
ing progressively less splendid as time went on. The events 
of the Fashoda affair, Niger boundary, and the Kruger telegram 
convinced these leaders that it was necessary to adopt a change 
in outlook.
Three key personages were to emerge during this period
who ware to have a profound effect on England and its movement
77towards alliance with France. / In France the rise of Delcasse 1, 
who was determined to secure rapproachment with England, began 
efforts to draw England into alliance against the Central Powers. 
This was reinforced in Britain by the succession of Edward VII 
to the throne and Lord Lansdovme to the Foreign Ministry in 1902. 
Both man ware known Francophiles. This created an atmosphere of 
cooperation which led to the Entente Cordiale in 1904, and, 
following the Moroccan crisis of 1905, to closer cooperation be­
tween France and England which culminated in the Anglo-French 
military and naval "conversations" between 1905 and 1912. These 
talks began as informal discussions but with the approval of
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Sir Edward Grey, the British and French naval staff elaborated 
technical arrangements for joint war action, which became the 
basis of the strategic plans of both countries* These “conver­
sations" were to continue without full cabinet knowledge down
78
to the summer of 1914*
1907-1914: The remaining seven years prior to the out­
break of war can be characterized as a period of growing oppo­
sition between alliances and a growing sense of interdependency 
among members of each alliance* This crystallization began 
slowly but accelerated markedly with the advent of the Balkan 
wars*
Three factors appear as central to the rising tempo of
tension and increasingly threatening environment in which
79Europe found itself during this period* First of these was 
the German fear of encirclement • With the Russo-English 
de'tente Germany saw herself as out manned, outgunned, and 
perceived, correctly it might be added, that this balance of 
power was daily becoming less favorable to the Central Powers* 
This was to be to her a salient concern during those days in 
July 1914, both in making imperative the maintenance of a solid
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alliance and as a filtering device for incoming information*
The second major factor was German-English naval competi­
tion* This was a critical concern in the minds of the English 
and created an atmosphere of suspicion and antagonism* The 
Germans were affixed with the so-called "Copenhagen complex”, 
a fear of an undeclared attack on Germany, and saw their in­
creasing naval strength as a means to security against sur­
prise attack; to the British it was an attempt to dominate 
England's vital trading routes* Here again is an excellent ex­
ample of the spiral of effect in application*
The final consideration was the continuous deterioration 
of Russo-German relations from 1908 onwards* Central to this 
deterioration was the Balkans* A series of actions by Austria 
and Serbia from 1909 to 1913 put Germany in the position of 
imposing settlements on Russia to maintain peace* The memory 
of these forced humiliations to Russian prestige and pride was 
to play a significant role in Russia's march to mobilization* 
Now that we have briefly surveyed the major events and 
conditions which formed the perceptual environment for the 
decision-makers, there remains but one portion of the situation 
that is not yet adequately developed - the Balkan problem*
Certainly the Balkan situation is one of the fundamental causes 
80
of the war* was the almost continuous conflict in this
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area that accelerated three important trends: 1) sharpened
82 %
the antagonism between the two alliances; 2) stimulated the 
general increase in armaments; and 3) led to increased inter­
dependency between members of each alliance and a distrust of 
any initiative of the other*
Basic to the conflict in the Balkans was the conflict be­
tween Russian desires to extend its influence on the Balkan 
peninsula, and realize its long-standing goal of controlling 
the Bosphorus Straights, and Austria*s attempts to preserve the 
status quo. Couple this with the ambitions of Serbia, Bulgaria, 
Rumania and Greece to include all peoples of their race within 
theix boundaries, and a rough approximation appears of the ex­
plosive mixture that existed.
This electrified atmosphere became hyper-charged by 
events which occurred between 1908 and 1913. The nBuchlau 
Bargain” of 1908, which was to be an exchange between Austria 
and Russia over two Serbian provinces and diplomatic support 
for Russian movement towards the Straights, degenerated into 
the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909. The Serbians, incensed over 
Austria.*s annexation of Bosnia, were eventually forced to
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accept a settlement championed by Germany* The end results
produced several important consequences, most important of
these being that: 1) it caused Europeans to distrust Austrian
diplomacy; 2) Germany got the blame fox Austrian actions as the
supposed "guiding hand"; 3) Austria had received its first
"blank check" support 4) Serbia was led to believe that it
could count on Russian support in the future to retake Bosnia;
5), most importantly, it generated tremendous activity in
Russia to reorganise, expand and re-equip its army, and prepare
83
for a war now considered by many to be inevitable*
The outcome of the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 was to
dramatically alter the power balance in such a way as to be
disasterous to Austria* Serbia was now in possession of an
84army of 200,000 men with 200,000 reserves* In the event of 
war with Russia, Austria would be forced to send a significant 
portion of its army to the Danube* Thus Austria found itself 
in an untenable position. Something would have to be done to 
prevent Serbia from solidifying its position and becoming 
increasingly dangerous to the continued existence of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire*
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The stage is now set; it remains but for the assassins 
to strike. We have seen how militarism, Balkan problems, and 
most basically a series of secret alliances have moved the 
primary actors towards their destiny. Europe has become two 
hostile camps, whose mutual mistrust, feax and misconcep­
tions have built from the modest agitations of 1904-1907 to the 
crescendo of hatred and perceived threat that was the summer 
of 1914.
Much has been written on that morning in Sarajevo and it
is of no value for the purposes of this study to linger at any
length with the assassination itself. Suffice it to say that 
the assassins were highly politicized young Serbian nationalists 
who ware trained by menders of a secret Serbian revolutionary 
society called the T1Union of Death11 (Ujedinjenje ili Smrt) or,
more commonly, the Black Hand.
85There were apparently four assassins along the Arch­
duke’s route that day. One assassin failed in an attempt to 
bomb Franz Fredinand about 45 minutes prior to his demise at 
the hand of a man named Princip. Even this might not have 
occurred had the driver not turned onto the wrong street and 
stopped directly in front of the assassins to turn around. In
85
Sidney B. Fa?/, The Origins of the World War 
(New York, 1966) v. 2, 87.
64
any case at approximately 11 o'clock the Archduke and his wife 
both lay dead.
Because of the disjointed actions of the various govern­
ments and the extended period of time between the death of 
Frans Fredinand (28 June) and the delivery of Austria's ulti­
matum to Serbia (23 July), it is most profitable to organize 
this section of the paper by looking at each country individual­
ly and its changing perceptions during this period. Most 
attention will be paid to the actions of Austria, Russia and 
Germany in this process for, as the reader will see, it was 
actions and perceptions of these decision-makers which are 
essential to understanding the "why" of July 1914.
AUSTRIAN REACT ION: To relate the role of threat and time
perception to the Austrian frame of reference it is best to 
think back to the events described above. Sidney Fay states 
in a succinct manner the Austrian situation as they saw it:
"For months and years past there had been a growing conviction 
among certain groups at Vienna that the political situation was 
becoming dangerous and intolerable for Austria in the Balkans. 
Thus even before Sarajevo, there was a general feeling on the 
part of many officers at Vienna that something must be done to 
prevent the decaying Hapsburg structure from crumbling 
to pieces • . The news of the Archduke's assassination enormously
65
86strengthened this fee ling • " General Conrad (Austrian Chief 
of Staff) gives credence to the view with his comment at the 
time. "It was not a question of a knightly duel with "poor 
little Serbia", he wrote, "nor punishment for the assassina­
tion. It was much more the highly practical importance of the 
prestige of a Great Power . . .  The Sarajevo assassination had 
torn down the house of cards erected by diplomacy in which 
Austria-Hungary had thought herself safe. The monarchy had 
been seized by the throat, and had to choose between allowing 
itself to be strangled and making a last effort to prevent its 
destruction*
It was with this disposition that Austria received word 
of the Archduke's death. Vienna was initially undetermined as 
to what should be done. As could be expected from the above 
quotation, General Conrad urged immediate mobilization. How­
ever, before the Foreign Minister, Count Berchtold, was will­
ing to move he felt it essential to check on two items. These 
were to determine Berlin's attitude, and to determine what
86
Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War 
(New York, 1966) v. 2, 183.
87
Frank L. Hob ley, The First World War 
(London, 1971) 109.
66
88
evidence was available to justify Austria’s proposed actions*
As a consequence a special emissary was dispatched to 
Potsdam to see the Kaiser on 5 July* The resulting promise of 
complete support which came from this meeting for any proposed 
Austrian action was a major factor in Austria’s aggressiveness* 
Implicit in Berlin's "blank check" was the expectation of a
89
localized conflict and rapid action by Austria against Serbia*
This was not to be* A series of events, prominently the
resistance of Count Tisza to starting a war, even after the 
Kaiser's committment was procured, dramatically slowed down the 
Austrian response* With the kaiser's support assured, Berchtold 
effectively ceased to listen to all outside information which
did not coincide with the corporate aim of the senior decision­
makers in Vienna-that being to eliminate Serbia as a mortal 
threat to the Empire* Two pointed warnings from Russia on the 
18th of July, and from Poincare' (who was visiting the Czar) 
on the 20th were totally ignored, exhibiting classic symptoms 
of the reactions expected under extreme stress discussed in the 
first chapter*
It was not until 6 pm on 23 July that the ultimatum was
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presented to Serbia, timed so as to catch Poincare1 on the first 
leg of a sea voyage home and thus out of communication* A reply 
was demanded within 48 hours to a document with a directness 
with few precedents in diplomatic history* As expected by those 
who prepared the diplomatic note, Serbia could not accept all 
of the demands made, although it did acquiesce to the vast 
majority of Austria*s demands* It took the Austrian ambassador 
only long enough to scan the document to ensure the Serbs had 
not met all demands, to state that the response was unsatisfactory* 
RUSSIAN REACTION: After the initial shock, the reaction
to the assassination was overshadowed by the continuing warnings
of Austrian responses against Russia and the newspapers indicat-
90
ing that they were glad to be rid of an enemy*
With the already supercharged atmosphere that existed in 
the Balkans, the Russians knew that some form of action would be 
taken by Austria* With the passage of days after the assassi­
nation and no action by Vienna, the Russian Chancellor, Saznov, 
became increasingly anxious* Saznov issued a statement on the 
18th that "Russia would not be indifferent to any effort to
humiliate Serbia* Russia could not permit Austrian menacing
91
language or military measures against Serbia"* Saznov was
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beginning to perceive, increasingly, the rising threat environ­
ment that was building up during this period. Central to 
Saznov9 s concerns was the fear that Austria would conduct a 
surprise attack that would humiliate Serbia directly, and there­
by Russia indirectly. The Chancellor9s positions and authority 
had been jeopardized through recent Russian rebukes, strong Pan- 
Slav sentiment in the press and pressure from the militarists. 
This sense of rising threat in both a personal and representa­
tive plane was to reduce significantly the Chancellor9s 
previous cautiousness.
The visit of Poincare9 at the critical juncture was to 
add yet another, and probably irresistable, reinforcement to 
the sense of overwhelming movement towards war. The French 
visit of 20-23 July was dominated by Poincare9 who directed 
discussions towards measures to be taken in view of the in­
creasing indications of Austria9s preparations to deliver a 
strong ultimatum to Serbia. Poincare9 wanted to strengthen 
Saznov9s attitude towards Austria. He wanted him to warn 
Austria against marking unacceptable demands on Serbia and to 
prevent him in case of need, from accepting any compromise
settlement which might be regarded as a diplomatic defeat for
92the Triple Entente at the hands of Germany and Austria.
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On July 23rd the French President left on his return 
voyage back to France, and Austria delivered Serbia the long* 
feared ultimatum. Bven though a note was surely anticipated, 
Saznov was incensed, when he received it, by Berchtold's 
method of purposeful deception, the severity of the note, and 
the shortness of time permitted for reply. In a real sense 
the delivery of this note marks the beginning of the true 
crisis period. The Russians, and all other Europeans, really 
entered a true crisis environment, characterized by an unan­
ticipated situation and short decision time, with the revela- 
of the harshness of the Austrian note and the very limited 
response period. The next 10 days was to be a period of ex­
treme stress, and increasing sense of national or alliance 
threat, characterized, as David Singer noted, by the fact 
that "not only in St. Petersburg, but everywhere in the 
foreign offices of Europe, responsible officials now began
to fall under a terrible physical and mental stress of over-
93work, worry, and lack of sleep."
However, it was in Russia that the reaction was the 
greatest. The feeling of the "inevitability" of war was now 
rapidly growing.On 24 July Saznov's request for a partial
93
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mobilization, which was in fact militarily impossible, against 
Austria was the most obvious manifestation of the quantum jump 
in perceived threat* The Chancellor, through reinforcement 
of the French ambassador and the militarists, began to focus 
singly on the preparation for war*
The mood in St* Petersburg on the next day was moving 
inexorably towards the ”inevitable” war* Fay sums up the re­
sults of the ministerial council on the 25th when he wrote 
that the "military leaders felt that a war between Austria 
and Serbia was therefore a war between Austria and Russia and 
therefore a wax between Russia and Germany* They had no
doubt that Austria was about to begin the invasion of Serbia
—  —  94
as soon as the time limit /of the ultimatum/ expired• " This
statement of perceived inevitable involvement is a reflection 
of a basic assumption made by the Russian decision unit: that 
because the real driving force was not Austria, but, Germany, 
it was assumed that no move of this gravity could be carried 
out without the full support of Berlin* Given Russia's 
slower mobilization rate and the importance placed on moving 
first, it becomes readily apparent that time was beginning to 
become a more salient factor* This view was verbalized by
94
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the French Ambassador in a conversation with the British
Ambassador about the latter*s recommendation for a conference
when he said that ,rtime did not permit this, either Austria
was bluffing or had made up her mind to act at once* In eith-
95
er case a firm and united attitude was our only chance • • "
The next morning brought news of Serbia's reply to the 
ultimatum and Austria's rejection of it* With this Saznov 
saw his fears substantiated and ordered the initiation of a 
"Period Preparatory to War"* This mobilization technique was 
devised to overcome Russia's slowness at mobilizing by get­
ting the jump on actual mobilization by activitating some of 
the slower processes* This was to prove to be one of the 
crucial events on the road to war, the obvious danger being 
the likelihood that Germany would identify the actions being 
taken as the mobilization itself*
GERMAN REACTION: German action during this period was
primarily passive and reactive* The key to Germany's "blank 
check" lay in her perceptions of the European environment at 
that moment* The major factors involved were: 1) the view 
that the monarchial tradition was so seriously threatened by 
Pan-Slavism that further inactivity would be unconsistent 
with self-preservation, 2} belief that Russia would not come
95
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to the aid of Serbia because of the horror of the assassin­
ation of a monarch, 3) belief that Russia was not completely 
recovered from the Russo-Japanese war, and 4) belief that
recent improvements in British-German relations would keep
96England from giving France support* German efforts during 
this period of 28 June to 26 July were oriented on keeping 
any possible Austro-Serbian conflict localized* These efforts 
were to be for nought however as the Triple Entente perceived 
this action as a German "master plan" to alter the balance 
of power in the Balkan's permanently* However that was un­
known to Germany at this time* A major cause of the hectic 
action later was in fact related to the Kaiser's firm belief 
that the issue could be localized and his refusal to allow 
the military to begin war preparations*
As the days passed after the Potsdam conference and 
no action was forthcoming, Berlin began to become more 
anxious* Repeated efforts were made by Bechmann to gain 
rapid action by the Austrians* As mid-July approached and 
it became more obvious that "localization" was unlikely, the 
Kaiser began attempting to gain support for a "stop at 
Belgrade" pledge and no permanent annexation of territory*
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These moves were frustrated by the Allies' distrust of German 
intention and Austria's refusal to reply on the plan* Still 
the Kaiser refused to allow preparations for war to begin.
When Austria released its ultimatum to Serbia, Germany 
committed a basic diplomatic blunder* Berlin did not know 
until 24 hours prior to delivery what the general contents 
of the ultimatum were, yet she came out immediately in full 
support of Austria's position. This support was extended for 
the same basic reasons that France extended her support to 
Serbia; the fear that any separation of allies would put the 
Triple Alliance in a perilous position vis a vis the Triple 
Entente* The impact of this was to completely discredit any 
and all German attempts to disclaim responsibility for 
Austria's action. Thus, further German efforts to mediate 
the situation were perceived as attempts to delay Allied 
response and preparations so that Austria could present 
Russia and France with a Serbian fait accomplis.
It was about this time that noticeable perceptions of 
threat and compressed time became evident. Reports came in 
of Russian preparations and the adamant positions taken by 
the Entente powers on the Kaiser's proposals. Yet even 
with the refusal of Austria's note by Serbia, the Kaiser 
could not be pushed into military action. He did not yet 
believe war inevitable.
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FRENCH AND BRITISH REACTION: With Poincare1 on the
high seas during the period from the 24th until the 29th of 
July, the French acting foreign minister did nothing. The 
British reacted much the same but for different reasons. Not 
being technically allied, London waited to see what the reac­
tions of others would be.
As it became known that Austria was preparing a harsh 
note for Serbia, England began to make considerable diplo­
matic efforts in an attempt to get both sides to "conversa­
tions" or a Hague tribunal, but to no avail. Strong efforts 
were also made to get Germany to exercise restraint on 
Austria, while in the meantime Britain maintained she had 
no ability to do likewise with France and Russia. Berlin 
was both reluctant to do this on principle, and in fact not 
able to do it anyway• With the delivery of the Austrian note, 
Britain began to move slowly towards the commitment that the 
Naval talks had virtually assured.
And so the stage is set. Surprise in the form of 
Austria's harshness and very short response time had injected 
the crisis element into the events of July 1914. Both sides 
saw attempts at negotiation by the other as efforts to take 
advantage of the situation to their gain. Mirror images ex­
isted between England and Germany of their own limited 
abilities and the others* expanded capabilities, and hence
75
their opposites responsibility to stop their allies* Both
coalitions had gone from minor levels of threat to the belief
that national prestige and existence was at stake* Delayed
responses and unwillingness to take the first step had pushed
all parties into feelings of compressed time available* All
that remained was for the act to occur*
Although it was discussed above, it is important here
to again briefly discuss the role that mobilization played
in the minds of all decision-makers in 1914* As Viscount
Haldane indicated, "General mobilization by a great power was
generally understood to mean that it had only resorted to
its final step of putting the great military machine in motion,
with the automatic movement of troops to the frontier • • •
when it had finally concluded that war could no longer be 
97avoided"* It is obvious then that mobilization was neither 
ordered lightly nor seen as a small event by other countries* 
The imperative of being first, to be fully mobilized and to 
fight in other*s territory, has obvious implications on the 
level of perceived threat and time from the events surveyed 
above•
RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION: If one event can be said to have
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gone past the point of no return, it would have to be the
decision of Russia to mobilize on 29 July 1914* News of the
Russian general mobilization caused military considerations
everywhere to take precedence over political considerations
and rendered futile and illusory all later diplomatic efforts
98such as the German request to Russia to stop mobilization*
After failing to bluff Austria on the 26th with mobili­
zation preparations, Saznov came to the conclusion that a 
European war was inevitable with the news on the 28th of 
Austria's declaration of war on Serbia* The French Ambassa­
dor indicated his country's "complete readiness to fulfill 
her obligations as an ally in case of necessity"* This 
assurance eliminated any remaining question of action* Saznov 
then approved the partial mobilization which had been ap­
proved in principle on the 25th* This was altered on the 
29th to a general mobilization, as the military was able to 
convince the Chancellor and the Czar that a partial mobiliza­
tion was not possible without putting the country in extreme 
danger if attacked by Germany* The General's arguments were 
reinforced by news of the bombardment of Belgrad and Germany's 
warning that Russian mobilization would lead to German
98
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mobilisation* The group opinion had solidified around the
opinion that war with Germany was unavoidable and that it would
be a mistake to postpone longer the general mobilisation or to
interfere with its succesful execution by first ordering a
99
partial mobilisation* And so on 29 July 1914 Russia put 
into motion a mobilisation machine she then could not stop* 
GERMAN MOBILIZATION: As in all other major European
capitals, events were happening and messages being passed in 
Berlin at a torrid rate* The situation had taken on an omi­
nous tone on 26 July with the Russian preparatory steps for 
war and French activity next to Alsace-Lorrain* Facts known 
by the Germans on the 27th were: 1) Russia had declared 
"Period Preparatory for War" on 26 July, 2) France had 
ordered home all divisions stationed outside of France and
3) France began guarding its railroads and had put the border 
town of Kavono on a war footing* However the Kaiser would 
still not allow preparations, waiting for an answer on his 
"stop at Belgrad” proposal* This attitude was to receive a 
jolt on 29 July as the result of the exchange of the "Willy- 
Nicky" telegrams in which the Czar indicated that mobiliza­
tion had not just bagun but "decided on five days ago for
99
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100reasons of defense on account of Austrian preparations"*
At this point the Kaiser decided he was being duped and made 
no further efforts to prevent events that followed*
When the Germans learned of Russia's probable mobiliza­
tion directive on the 30th they were in a panic* Moltke 
quickly saw that a two front war was about to explode upon 
Germany and she was giving away her only trump card - the 
ability to mobilize and strike more rapidly than her antago­
nists* The following day Moltke received irrefutable evi­
dence that Russia had mobilized, with this the Kaiser re­
lented and a state of "Threatening Danger of War" (the German 
equivalent to Russia's Period Preparatory to War) was de­
clared at 1300 hours 31 July.
It is essential to note here that the German General 
Staff had long built its war plans on the belief that 
Germany's only chance for victory was to strike rapidly in 
the west, defeat France within 6 weeks, and move against 
Russia* In 1911 the Schlieffen Plan had been modified to 
change the balance between the left and right wings, making 
it absolutely critical that Liege be captured within the 
first few days of the war* This made mobilization a "stand
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pat and negotiate" basis impossible* Thus once the decision 
was made for mobilisation, Germany had necessarily to strike 
the first blow*
The final card was played when Berlin was informed that 
Russia could not stop its mobilization "for technical reasons"* 
Seeing wax close at hand9 and believing speed her only chance 
for survival, Germany ordered mobilization at 1700 hours on 
1 August and declared war on 3 August 1914*
FRENCH MOBILIZATION: Poincare* landed at Dunkirk on 
29 July and proceeded to Paris where he found military prepara­
tions under way for mobilization* Poincare*s major concern 
during the period was with getting Britain to declare her 
comitment to France and Russia, and taking military precau­
tions in France* No efforts were made to stop the Russian 
mobilization* The President was shown a series of preparations 
being made by the Germans, virtually the same type of activi­
ties reported to Berlin, Poincare* also found a telegram wait­
ing for him from Saznov stating that, "not being able to 
accede to Germany's desire /that Russia cease her military
preparations/, it only remains for us to hasten our arrange-
~  102 
ments and regard war as inevitable"*
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News received from the French Ambassador at St* 
Petersburg on 31 July definitely confirmed Russia's mobili­
zation order* This, combined with word of Germany's declara­
tion of "Threatening Danger of War", left little doubt in the 
minds of the French cabinet that a European war was now in­
evitable* General Joffre demanded complete mobilization,
stating that every delay of 24 hours would cause the initial
103abandonment of 15-20 kilometers* The Cabinet finally 
authorized mobilization on 1 August (some 15 minutes before 
the same action in Berlin)*
BRITISH MOBILIZATION: The decision for England on
whether to Join France and Russia was made, or at least 
heavily influenced, by a diplomatic blunder of major propor­
tions by Bethmann-Holweg on 29 July* That afternoon he 
called on the British Ambassador, Goshen, to attempt to 
secure Britain's neutrality* During the conversation 
Bethmann stated that, in regards to Belgium, he "could not
tell to what operations Germany might be forced by the
104actions of France • • •" The effect of this statement was 
to cause opinion in London to believe that "Germany
103
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practically admits the intention to violate Belgium*s neu-
105
traility and is practically determined to go to war"*
The British would not accept an attack on Belgium for 
several reasons: 1) Britain was unwilling to bargain on her 
obligations to Belgium, 2} did not want to disgrace Britain's 
good name by being part of a bargain for the conquest of 
Prance, and 3) wanted to maintain a "Free hand"* But the 
deepest reason was that Britain considered the northern 
coast of France as part of her "critical boundarys" and felt 
she could not tolerate an unfriendly nation that close to 
English shores*
On 31 July Grey appears to have decided that "England's 
obligation of honor to France and her own material interests 
made it imperative for her to intervene on the Franco-Russian 
side"10^ With the mobilization of France and Germany on 
1 August, the Cabinet met on 2 August, the "Sunday of Resolve" 
and after deliberation committed the fleet to protection 
of the French coast* Two days later Britain declared war on 
Germany as she moved through Belgium*
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Thus the issue was joined* We have seen all the major 
powers of Europe moved from a period of relative stability, 
however uneasy, to open conflict which would prove to be the 
most destructive ever seen of human life* Running throughout 
the intricate and complex patterns of events the basic under­
lying causes remain visible, Militarism, the alliance systems, 
and the characteristics of mobilization.
It was seen that the alliance systems that developed 
and solidified during the early years of the 20th century 
were to come to have an almost overpowering effect on all 
statesmen and their ordering of priorities* Time and again 
actions were initiated or supported that were not, in fact, in 
the best interest of peace or even that country's welfare* 
Alliance cohesion became a prime mover of man and nation, and 
a reason in itself for actions that might otherwise have had 
no chance of being executed. The event of July 1914 showed 
conclusively that this phenomenon had progressed to the point 
that all initiatives of a given country were viewed positively 
or negatively not on the basis of merit (as both the British 
and Germans proposed plans that were, objectively, reasonable 
solutions) but on the basis of which alliance had sponsored 
it* Initiatives were almost uniformly accepted by one’s own 
allies and dismissed out of hand by the opposing forces*
The alliances further acted to drastically increase 
the sense of insecurity of member nations* This was
83
particularly true of the Triple Alliance powers* A mani­
festation of its pervasiveness can be seen in the Kaiser's 
marginalia days prior to the outbreak of war when he wrote 
on 30 July 1914 that England and France were "waging a war 
of extinction • • • England sneeringly reaps the brilliant 
success of her persistantly prosecuted purely anti-German 
world policies, against which we have proved ourselves vir­
tually helplessV^*0^
From the sequence of events portrayed during the crisis 
period itself, it would appear almost impossible to overstate 
the importance of the mobilization process and its role in 
precipitating the actual outbreak of hostilities* Within 
the conceptual framework it becomes possible to observe how 
decision-makers would acutely sense time compression over a 
series of actions that might take weeks to occur* Certainly 
the "automatic" nature of mobilization had a tremendous 
effect on decision makers, both in sensing time inadequacy and 
perception of threat* No country could afford to allow its 
opponent to gain any significant advantage in mobilizing 
forces without permanently prejudicing its own fortunes*
July 1914 was an excellent example of the tendency
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discussed in the first chapter for decision units to perceive 
their opponents as having progressively greater control over 
the situation at hand, while they become less and less capable 
of influencing events* Communications played a significant 
role in this process, the results of which were described with 
force by Joachim Remak when he noted that "what appears in 
print is likely to look neat and logical, in truth, more often 
than not, was chaotic or at best improvised. Decisions were 
made with no time for proper reflection, messages crossed 
each other, and some of the fateful errors were committed 
from motives no more profound gr sinister than lack of infor­
mation or sleep".*0®
It would appear from the information available here 
that the three working hypotheses at least fail to be dis- 
confirmed. There is, to the contrary, evidence to suggest 
they may hold true. Numerous examples appear which cleaxly 
relate the parallel perceptions of increasing threat and 
saliency of time; the actions of all the General Staff *s 
after Austria's ultimatum was given in the most immediate 
and obvious example of this phenomenon.
In the diaries, memoranda, and official documents of
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all the major European powers statements appear indicating 
the belief that a European war would be disastrous for every­
one. Yet, obviously, the immediate national and alliance needs 
of July 1914 took precedence in determining priorities. Immed­
iate needs dominated to the point that nations which knew their 
long range good lay in continued peace initiated a wax they 
all agreed would bring disasterous consequences.
The willingness to consider alternatives is directly re­
lated to the perceptual set of the two opposing alliances and 
the perceived adequacy of time. It was here shown that the 
range of alternatives presented and the time available were 
directly correlated. The continuum would run from Austria, 
which was essentially in a state of high threat and short 
time in the initial stage, making no suggestions and effective­
ly working to thwart those presented, to Britain, which was 
the most active and least involved initially and, in fact, 
was last to enter the war. Another facet of the time factor 
was the influence on the technology available to transmit 
these messages. The sense of inadequacy was generally en­
hanced by the nature of time it took to send and receive 
messages and the continuous crossing of messages.
CHAPTER III
THE UNITED STATES DECISION TO INTERVENE: KOREA 1950
It was early on that foggy Saturday in June 1950; 
suddenly a distant role of thunder - was it rain? It took 
less than 30 seconds for the sleepy South Korean troops to 
discover that the only rain falling was a deadly rain of 
steel* Before the dazed South Koreans could recover their 
composure a vast force was overrunning positions all along 
the front* Grudgingly but surely the defenders began to 
fall back before the weight of the North Korean Peoples 
Liberation Army*s (KPLA) 7 Infantry Divisions and her 
Armoured Brigade*
It is hard to tell during those first few hectic days 
who was the more surprised -the soldier on the front or the 
diplomat in the rear* But one thing was clear - the war all 
had feared and some predicted was here* Before the two 
forces were again on their respective sides of a demilit­
arized zone, the United States would have backed up the
decisions made by its leaders during the last five days of
109
June 1950 with the lives of 33,629 men*
109
Roy E* Appleman, US Army in the Korean War: South to
Naktonq, North to the Yalu (Washington D* C*, 1960) 3*
86
87
The decision by President Truman to commit the United 
States to the defense of South Korea is considered by many 
authors to be one of the most important decisions of the 20th 
Century* j£ts impact was to be far reaching; it contributed 
substantially to a containment policy in South East Asia, set 
the course for US-Chinese relations that would last a genera­
tion, and presented America with her first experience of a 
frustrating, faction-building process known as limited war*
The purpose, then, of this chapter will be to look at 
this event in history in light of the framework developed in 
the first part of the paper* In order to present data and 
events in a manner most conducive to a clear conceptualiza­
tion of the role of perceived threat and time compression, 
the chapter has been organized using a combination of situa­
tional and chronological ordering devices.
The first portion of the chapter will be a brief review 
of the relevant events in South East Asia from 1945 to 1950. 
This will be followed by sections which will develop the 
national and international settings forming the immediate 
perceptual environment of mid 1950. With the ’’definition 
of the situation” then developed, a detailed account of the 
important events occurring from 25 June 1950 to 30 June 1950 
will be presented to enable the reader to understand what 
happened, and the role of the phenomenon under investigation
88
in the output of the Truman decision unit# The final section 
of the chapter will be to reflect on what was uncovered and 
to suggest some possible conclusions to be drawn#
US AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 1945-1950: It would not be over­
stating the opinion of the period to say that United States 
interest in Korea at the close of the Second World Wax was 
minimal at best. The initial division of Korea was an admin­
istrative convenience established by the American military 
forces to facilitate disarmament of residual Japanese units 
on the Korean peninsula# Believing the task of collecting 
the items of war throughout the total of Korea to be beyond 
the capability of the American units available for the task, 
the US asked Russia to conduct the collection process north 
of the 38th parallel# This was the initial step in the well- 
detailed road to the situation which manifested itself that 
summer of 1950#
There is a point of some sophistication that is not so 
well documented that needs to be addressed in understanding 
the "why" of U#S# intervention into Korea. The point in 
question is the abrupt and dramatic change that occurred in 
the balance which the United States had sought to achieve in 
this part of the world.
Korea had boon seen as unimportant for a very simple 
reason. At that time it was expected by American strategic 
planners that China would, under Generalisirao Chaing Kai Shek,
89
become the bulwark of containment against Russian desires in 
this part of the world. Japan was to be kept emasculated and 
a relative non-entity in the power equation of the region. In 
such an environment Korea would easily be controlled and posed 
no particular interest.
Obviously this scenario was never to come to pass. As 
the writing on the wall became bigger and bolder the United 
States was forced to reorient its efforts to develop a res­
training force in South East Asia. The only other reasonable 
possibility was a revitalized Japan. Slowly but surely the 
realization of the strategic position of the Korean peninsula 
in relation to the South China Sea, and as an invasion spring­
board to Japan, began to make itself felt. However, by the 
summer of 1950 this idea was still very much formu1ative 
(remembering the Peoples Republic of China did not exist un­
til 1 October 1949). A reflection of this ambiguous status 
will appear later in the chapter in some of the statements 
made by various statesmen.
Given the ambivalent attitude at this time and the 
particularly vociferous attacks being made by senior Republi­
cans in Congress about staying out of this part the world, 
it is not without soira justification that the NKPLA had 
determined that the United States would not contest a fait
90
accompli by the North Koreans* Unquestionably the North
Koreans must have been as flabbergasted on the 30th of June 
as was President Truman on the 25th.
This then was the “macro11 environment which encompassed 
the specifics of the immediate internal and external settings 
as they existed in 1950. It remains for us now to complete 
the decision units perceptual set by discussing these two 
settings®
INTERNAL SETTING: The internal setting involves, at
a minimum, two inter-related and inter-acting forces, 1) 
prominent, or key personalities, and 2) the domestic politi­
cal situation. The importance of either of these can, and 
will, differ drastically depending on the time, nation, and 
personalities involved. In the case of Korea the dynamics 
of two personalities were to prove to be the dominant, which 
is not to say the sufficient, factors in the direction and 
form of the decisions of 25-30 June 1950. Because of the 
prominence of Fresidant Truman and Secretary of State Acheson 
in these proceedings, it is appropriate to taka a moment to 
briefly sketch the personality traits of revelance to their 
crisis dacision-making*
President Truman could have personified the American
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national experience after 1945 when he described becoming
President as having been nsuddenly catapulted into the midst
of world-shaking episodes”.111 He conceptualised the role
of himself as President as filling the people's desire for a
strong President, champion of the common man, with a
112historic mission to be ready to make decisions*
The President had a penchant for equating problems he 
faced with historical precedents* For Truman, "todays prob­
lems are largely yesterdays implications • • • he held that 
for almost all present problems there were precedents that
113
would provide clear guides to the right principles of action"*
In addition to history, a characteristic feature of President 
Truman's pattern of decision-making was the way he sought to 
base decisions upon group deliberation among his advisors*
Paige noted, "When faced with a major occasion for decision, 
the President's customary practice was to gather his principle 
advisors, to state or have someone state the matter for
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decision, to elicit individual expression of opinion, to en­
courage further discussion for the clarification of issues,
114and then to decide or to delay decision”*
In a great many respects, the views of Acheson and the 
President were almost one and the same* This was particular­
ly true of the perceived roles of the Secretary of State and 
of the President* Acheson saw the proper role for the
Secretary of State as that of the ”first minister” and
115
”senior member of the cabi.net”* Acheson felt that he
should be the principal, unifying, and final source of recom­
mendations to the President on foreign policy* Acheson's 
style of leadership and organization to produce recommenda­
tions was very similar to that stated above for the President* 
Thus Secretary Acheson expressed skepticism of the "too 
facile and pat”, shunned the idea that American foreign
policy could be based on readings taken from a piece of moral
116
”litmus paper”*
Now that a brief look at the two dominant personalities
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involved has been made, it remains to build around them the 
domestic political situation. When the occasion for decision 
in Korea was abruptly thrust upon them, the President, 
Secretary of State, and other Administration leaders were 
caught up in a complex network of reciprocal influences and 
expectations that characterize executive - legislative re­
lations. This relationship was in a particularly sensitive 
state because this was a midterm election year and the subtle 
linkages between political leadership and public opinion were 
at the forefront.
Two issues of the day brought sharp partisan conflict 
and growing bitterness in Congress. These issues were the 
Administration^ policies towards Nationalist China and the 
claim that the State Department was infiltrated by communists. 
The split on these issues was particularly bitter and caused 
the disintergration of what had been a bipartisan effort in 
international affairs. The 80th Congress had had agreement
among 82% of the Republicans and 92% of the Democrats on
117
foreign aid bills. This schism started a period of acri-
mony between the parties and also split the Republican Party 
over Senator McCarthy*s tactics.
In June of 1950 the relations between the Administra-
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tion and the Congress were characterized by a complex set of
conflicting supportive, and avoidant relations* The President,
Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense were all under
critical attack: the President for his over-all leadership,
Secretary Acheson for his China policy (of non-involvement on
China’s civil war) and for harboring subversives, and Defense
Secretary Johnson for sacrificing military needs for budget 
118compression*
It obviously takes no great perceptive faculties to 
see that the internal setting for the coming crisis was some­
thing less than ideal, but this only provides one aspect of 
the situational set* The other part is the external setting.
By June of 1950 the United States policy makers had 
generally coza to view the world as bi-polar. One camp was 
seen as a combination of Russian national power, universal 
revolutionary ideology, and an international political move­
ment. The other camp was seen as a coalition, centered on
American power, of nations determined to escape communist 
119
dominat ion.
From presidential speeches made during the spring of
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1950, an observer could note the international situation
being described as one in which the United States of America
stood as the leader of an international moral crusade against
an evil and aggressive foe* For the President, Communism was
an offensive designed to "penetrate, divide, confuse, and
120subvert free peoples"• In order to cope with the inter­
national environment the President called for two main cour­
ses of action; "First, we cannot compromise our own moral
12and ethical beliefs, and second we cannot isolate ourselves"* 
Thus the President summoned the American people to demonstrate 
the moral and material superiority of the free world over 
Communism*
Words and ideas such as those above undoubtedly had 
little or no influence on the men in the Kremlin who heard 
them* Used to the polemics of their own orbit, these state­
ments were surely given no weight* With the reader's 20-20 
hindsight it can be seen that here was a man who meant ex­
actly what he said* Any sudden violent action that changed
the status quo was almost certain to be seen as unacceptable* 
However, the President was not the only voice speaking
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out, Secretary Ache son, a believer in Real Politik* saw as 
the central task of American diplomacy in the post-war era 
the creation of a balance of power such that the Soviet lea­
ders could be brought to a general live-and-let-live policy* 
In working towards this policy Acheson attempted to 
limit the area of American interest in South Bast Asia* One 
of the oft-quoted pronouncements on this area of interest, 
or "defense perimeter", as it was referred to, was from a 
speech on January 12, 1950, when he stated, "This defensive 
perimeter runs along the Aluetians to Japan and then goes to 
the Ryukus Islands • • • from the Ryukus to the Phi lip ine 
Islands * • • So far as the military security of other areas 
in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person 
can guarantee these against military attack * * * Should such 
an attack occur • • • the initial reliance must be on the
people attacked to resist it and then upon the commitment
~  122 
of the entire civilized world * *
This view was a combination of beliefs that the United 
States could not protect everything whilst at the same time 
fearing that any place that the free world showed weakness, 
a political vacuum would be created into which the Soviets
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would flow* Events on the International scene since 1945 
had caused the American decision unit to see international 
affairs as essentially dichotomous, threatening, and re­
quiring the application of counter-veiling force* Me* 
Truman had first developed this impression during the Pots­
dam conferences when he noted to the then Secretary of De­
fense Byrnes on January 5, 1945, ,fanother war is in the
making* Only one language do they understand - 'how many
123
divisions have you'?” This view was reinforced in three 
areas of confrontation that were to occur in the 1945-50 
era: these were Iran (1946), Greece (1947-48), and Berlin
(1949)* These confrontations were viewed as successful 
contests of strength and will*
Two events were to cause the United States to begin to 
feel a change in the international power balance* With the 
explosion of an Atomic bomb by the Soviet Union and the 
emergence of Communist China in late 1949, it gradually be­
came obvious that some of the previous assumptions on which 
the old balance was predicated were no longer valid* As a 
consequence the President reacted on 30 January 1950 to a 
lowered sense of security by asking for a major policy
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reappraisal by State and Defense Departments • The study was
done between February and April of 1950 and then submitted
to the President* The President then gave it to the National
Security Council for study (later known as NSC 68)* The
National Security Council was in the process of cost analysis
when the war broke out, but was understood to have recommended
a greatly increased military budget and improvement of con-
124ventional forces*
As a potential source of trouble, Korea was included 
in NSC-68 along with Finland, Berlin, Iceland, and Yugoslavia* 
Yet the predominant opinion of the intelligence community 
during the spring of 1950 was that there would be little 
chance of an all-out invasion of South Korea*
SATURDAY, JUNE 24th: Although some writers such as
I* F* Stone have attempted to build a case that the attack 
by the North Koreans was either encouraged or instigated by 
the South Koreans and Americans, there is an overwhelming 
body of information which shows conclusively that the attack 
was a complete surprise* This needs to be qualified by say­
ing that US intelligence agencies were aware of North Korea's
124
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aggressive posture as early as in March* However the Supreme
Command Allied Powers (SCAP) evaluated the reports as doubt -
ful* The Pentagon agreed with this evaluation and anticipated
only guerrila action* As late as 18 June 1950, the Chairman
of the Joint Chief’s of Staff (JCS) and Secretary of Defense
were briefed at SCAP headquarters and given no indication of
125
a pending North Korean attack*
So, as stated in the introduction to this chapter, it 
was a tremendous surprise to both the soldiers and diplomats 
when the NKPLA struck at 0400 hours 24 June 1950* John E* 
James, a UP I correspondent, gave the world its first news of 
the Korean war; his telegram reached the US early on the 25th 
(the reader should keep in mind the date/time change between 
Korea and the United States) which stated: ”250925 JAMBS 
FRAGMENTARY RPTS . . . INDICATED NORTH KOREANS LAUNCHED 
SUNDAY MORNING ATTACKS GENERALLY ALONG ENTIRE BORDER”.126 
Some two hours later the first official notice was received 
from Ambassador Muccio, and stated in part, "According to 
Korean Army reports • • • North Korean forces invaded
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Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning •
. . It would appear from the nature of the attack and the
manner in which it was launched that it constitutes an all-out
127
offensive against the Republic of Korea"•
A small group of officials hurriedly met at the State 
Department at approximately 2230 hours. After conferring 
together,Dean Rusk(Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs), John 
Hickerson (Secretary for UN Affairs) and Frank Pace (Secretary 
of the Army) called Ache son at his farm at 2245 hours recom­
mending immediate notification of the UN of what had happened 
and requesting an emergency meeting. Acheson agreed to these 
measures and then called the President, who was at his home 
in Missouri at 2320 hours to inform him. Acheson advised 
the President not to return immediately as the situation was 
still too uncertain.
The information from the fighting front was fragmentary;
neither the ultimate intentions of the attackers nor the ex-
123
tent of their immediate gains were clear. The general
feeling at the time was that the Republic of Korea Army 
(ROXA) could hold its ovm against an attack by the North
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unless active support was being given by the Soviets* If the
invasion was serious, they had no doubts but that it was a
129
Soviet directed operation*
The first day was here and gone, as Glenn Paige indic­
ates, "The officials shared a strong sense of the emergency 
of the situation - the need to do something and do it without
1
delay* The North Korean invasion had caught them by surprise'^ 
So it had* Compounding the sense of threat inherent in the 
attack was the tremendous distance between the officials res­
ponsible for making these decisions and the events them­
selves* Certainly no small amount of anxiety was added by 
the fact that it was discovered that there was no position 
paper prepared on Korea for policy guidance* All contingency 
plans developed had been built on the assumption of a general 
conflagration, in which case Korea was to be left to fend for 
herself*
SUNDAY JUNE 25: On arriving at the State Department,
Acheson received signs of a worsening situation - Muccio was
evacuating all US dependents and non-combatants, and President 
Rhee was moving his capitol South to Suwan0 Reports were
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coming in that indicated the South Koreans were disintegrat­
ing* In view of events Acheson decided to call Truman and 
recommend that he return to Washington D* C* The sense of 
compressed time already felt by the President was indicated 
in this telephonic conversation, as he told the Secretary of 
State that "some decision would have to be made at once as
to the degree of aid or encouragement which our government
131
was willing to extend to the Republic of Korea"*
On the plane returning from Independence, the President
reflected on historical precedents and noted that "the North
Korean attack was the same in nature as the German, Italian
and Japanese aggression that had led to World War II* * •
if the Communist leaders were appeased, then gradually the
scale of violence and the number of participating states
would increase to global dimensions ••• considered it right
to resist promptly and effectively the North Korean aggress- 
132ion”* The President then made crystal clear the sense of
threat he perceived in the situation* The opponent was not 
the NKPLA but Communism as a whole* The attack becomes 
critical to American values not because of South Korea, but
131
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because of the implication it had for spreading into areas 
of truly central importance to the American people*
The President axrived in Washington D*C* at 1920 hours 
and went immediately to the Blair House where a group of 13 
selected advisors were waiting on him* There were representa­
tives from State (Acheson, Rusk, Webb, Hickerson, Jessup), 
from Defense (Johnson, Pace, Matthews, Pinletter) and from 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (Bradley, Collins, Sherman, Vanderburg)* 
The President opened the meeting by encouraging dis­
cussion and having Acheson recap the last 24 hours* Secretary
Acheson then advanced 5 proposals worked out by his staff for
133
discussion* These were:
1* SCAP furnish ROKA additional military equipment*
2* US warplanes cover the withdrawal of American 
dependent s *
3* US warplanes be authorized to destroy KPLA tanks 
and planes that attempt to disrupt the evacuation*
4* Consideration be given to further aid in support 
of the UN resolution calling for a North Korean withdrawal* 
5* 7th Fleet neutralize the Formosan Straights*
By the end of the discussion all had been approved except #5, 
which the President decided to "sleep on"*
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The general opinion that developed out of this first 
meeting contributed to later perception of time compression 
by the dual tendency to accept fragmentary reports of limited 
ROKA counter-attacks as a sign of their ability to hold the 
NKPLA, and a parallel tendency to underestimate the capabili­
ties of the N0rth Koreans* Thus the consensus of the 
President and his advisors, based on the general trend and 
earlier calculations, was that the South Koreans could 
probably contain the attack unless the North Koreans had re­
ceived extensive assistance* The invasion was seen as a 
Soviet Grand Strategic move with many possible ramifications;
primarily as a threat to Japanese security and to the
134collective security program built by the US*
The situation at this first meeting was not seen as a 
question of whether to intervene or not* However, as each 
advisor gave his opinion it became obvious that a kind of 
unspoken agreement existed that " * • • Whatever had to be 
done to meet this aggression had to be done* There was no
13!
suggestion * * * that * * * the US could back away from it”*
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The conference ended with a general sense of resolve
among all present. The agreed upon recommendations then
were passed telephonically to MacArthur• Jessup was later
to maintain that "on the basis of this conference the US-
under the banner of the U.N. - was prepared to accept the
catastrophy of World Wax III if it proved to be unavoidable
because of American refusal to accept the intolerable evils
of appeasement" •
MONDAY, 26 JUNE: Word that Kim II Sung had rejected
out of hand the U.N. proposal at 2030 hours on the evening
before set the tone for possibly the most critical day of
the Korean crisis. By mid-afternoon the prospects for
survival of the Republic of Korea were diminishing at a
rapid rate. Late in the afternoon SCAP sent a situation
report painting a grim picture of events: "Piecemeal entry
into action vie, Seoul , • , not successful in stopping the
penetration • • • tanks entering suburbs of Seoul • • ,
South Korean units unable to resist determined Northern
offensive • , « our estimate is that a complete collapse is 
137
imminent"," The implications of this message are obvious
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the threat was much more serious than originally estimated 
and the time to deal with it was somewhat less. Upon hear­
ing the report, President Truman had Acheson set up a second
meeting for 2100 hours with the same group that had met the 
previous evening, stating that the situation was so threaten­
ing as to require it.
The meeting followed the same format as the previous 
night. Agreement existed at the onset among the conferees
that if the United States did not come to the aid of South
Korea within the next several hours there might be no further
decisions to be made concerning the preservation of the Korean 
138
Republic, Secretary Acheson made a series of proposals
139
which he and his staff had worked out that day. These were:
1, Navy and Air Force should be instructed to give 
"fullest possible support" south of the 38th parallel.
2, Orders be issued to cause the 7th Fleet to prevent 
either China from attacking the other,
3, Military forces (U,S.) in the Phillipines be 
strengthened and increased military assistance be provided 
to the Phillipine government. That military assistance be
138
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accelerated to Vietnam and a MAG (Military Advisory Group) 
be sent there•
With minimal discussion the recommendations were approved as 
presented. It can be seen by the contents that ground inter­
vention was still not contemplated. However the really 
critical point was that the US had indicated its intention 
to commit American combat power.
The conferees and the President drew historical para­
llels between the present situation and Axis powers in World 
War II, much as Truman had done on the plane two days earlier. 
The President and his advisors reached agreement that a 
failure of the United States to save ROK would be intolerable. 
They calculated that with every blow to ROK that went un­
answered, the reputation and prestige of America sank lower 
and lower. The viability of collective security was also 
perceived to be in jeopardy. Thus while the loss of Korea 
as a piece of real estate would not have meant a direct threat 
to American military security, the President and his advisors
perceived a logical progression which would inevitably
140
menace the safety of the United States, This idea was
summed up by Secretary of State Ache son when he noted that
140
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the North Korean action • • • "was a challenge to the whole
system of collective security not only in the Far East but
everywhere in the world. It was a threat that all nations
would be intimidated by this show of force".
The decision to meet force with force in Korea was
essential. It was the unanimous view of the political and
military advisors of the President that this was the right 
141thing to do". With the closing of this meeting, the
United States had taken its first gigantic step into the 
Korean War. Air and Naval forces would new be committed to 
battle. The decisions reached at the Blair House were 
announced the next day (27th).
TUESDAY, 27 JUNE: This was a day of no great activi­
ty germane to this study. Efforts centered around UN 
activities and attempts to get Russia to stop the North 
Koreans. On the home front, the President entertained a 
delegation from Congress and received support from Dewey, 
the titular head of the Republican party.
WEDNESDAY, 28 JUNE: Throughout this period the
President was having all concerned departments do restudies 
and ro-evaluations of potential results of the Korean action 
on areas of concern on the Soviet periphery. The President
141
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and his advisors did not make any new decision on this day
but scanned all incoming information for indicators of a
Soviet response to the request to stop the North Koreans.
THURSDAY, 29 JUNE: The situation was to climax on this
day, with word of Seoulfs fall the day before and reports
coming in from SCAP indicating imminent disaster. A 0700
report from SCAP estimated ROKA casualties of about 50% and
stated that it was questionable whether ROKA forces could
142
hold the Han River line. As the report was followed by
more of a similar nature it became obvious to all that the 
air and naval power would not do the job. With the situa­
tion becoming continuously less stable the Secretary of 
Defense called the President and arranged a meeting at 1700 
that night.
The same basic group that had attended previously was 
on hand with the addition of Symington of the National 
Security Resources B0ard and Ley of the NSC staff • The 
meeting centered around Secretary of Defense Johnson who 
gave a presentation on the main difficulties hampering 
military action in Korea. He then made a series of recom­
mendations with the major one being to put service and combat
142
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troops into Pusan* The President was uneasy about US troops 
being commited, but Acheson showed him the Soviet response 
to a query made to Russia on the 27th asking the Soviets to 
call off the NKPLA* The note indicated that it would do no­
thing to stop the North Koreans but also that they would not 
intervene in Korea against U.S. troops* This information
opened the way for the eventual entry of large scale American
143
ground troops*
The meeting lasted only 40 minutes and produced two 
144directives: 1) restrictions on aircraft to stay below
the 38th parallel were lifted, and 2) service and combat troops 
were authorized to be dispatched to Pusan to secure the 
embarkation facility* As the President’s advisors left the 
White House they were unaware that North Korean tanks had 
already broken through the Han River line and were pushing 
reminants of ROK units before them.
The meeting on the 29th, as with the two earlier ones, 
demonstrated by comments of the participants and actions 
taken that the situation was perceived as a significant
143
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threat to vital US national interests. The definite des­
truction of the idea that the ROK forces could handle the 
situation by the 29th and the increasing rate of collapse 
acted to continuously raise the sense of time compression.
The less the myth of ROK ability to handle the invasion was 
believed, the more urgent became the perceived requirement 
for immediate decisive action.
FRIDAY, 30 JUNE: At approximately 0400 hours an
urgent telegram arrived belatedly from SCAP headquarters 
stating the results of MacArthur * s personal visit of 28 June. 
The message said in part: "On 30 June 1950 CINCFE informs 
the JCS9 after a recon of the Korean battle area, that the 
Korean Army was in total confusion . . .  the most the South 
Korean Army could hope to accomplish would be to retard the 
advance of the enemy. The South K0rean Army was incapable 
of united action . . .  the only assurance . . .  to regain
lost ground would be through the commitment of US ground
145combat forces”. MacArthur recommended one Regimental
Combat Team (RCT) and two Divisions to follow as the forces
to be sent. The massage was passed on with the urging from 
SCAP that "time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision
145
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without delay is essential”•
After a conference between members of the JCS, Secre­
tary Pace (Array) was informed of the report. He in turn 
called the President who immediately approved the release of 
the RCT but withheld decision on the two divisions. The
last of the major meetings was set up for 0930 hours at the 
146
White House.
The meeting was to last but 30 minutes and centered
around the determination of the adequacy of two divisions.
With virtual unanimous approval it was decided that SCAP
would be authorized to send in the two divisions and was
147
given ”full authority to use troops under his command”.
With this done, the meeting ended and the Pentagon 
officials left to begin the massive preparations required. 
President Truman addressed a Boy Scount convention and went 
for a cruise on the Presidential yacht. So ended the week 
that was.
CONCLUSIONS: According to David Reese in his 
excellent book Korea: The Limited War, the decisions made
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148
between 25-30 June had many roots* Among these are:
1* The desire to uphold law in international life*
2* The desire to uphold collective security*
3* The contest of will between east and west*
4* Korea was seen as "another anschluss".
5* It was seen as the application of the US policy 
of containment*
6* The defense of Korea would bolster NATO is that 
belief that the US would defend them if necessary*
7* Complex "Pacific considerations" centered around 
the Japanese industrial base.
This author would posit that these explanations for action 
track vary wall with the evidence here presented to demon­
strate the sense of perceived threat and its raising during 
the period in question.
Central to the validity of the observation is the 
realization that the threat perceived was only symbolically 
connected with the physical entity called the Republic of 
Korea. A brief reflection on tha external setting for this 
decision unit causes the reader to see that this threat was 
very real indeed from the point of view of the participants.
148
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The fact that the level of perceived threat rose during this 
6 day period was demonstrated both in the comments provided 
and in the actions these decision elites executed* Moving 
from cautious, non-committal responses on the 24th to the 
commitment of two full divisions on the 30th*
The sense of time compression is equally shown, moving 
from the initial belief that ROKA units would stop the 
attack on the 24th and 25th to the plea of MacArthur on the 
29th for "a decision without delay” if South Korea is to be 
held* The sense of urgency displayed by the participants 
became progressively greater as the week advanced culminating 
in decisions being made telephonically in the early morning 
hours, and instructions to SCAP being sent by voice instead 
of cable*
Additionally a reasonable case can be made for the 
proposition that the speed of decision-making was artificially 
rapid, and the best example in itself of the effects of per­
ceived time saliency* The course of events following Truman1s 
decision shows no overwhelming objective requirement demand­
ing action by the 30th of June* The American Far East 
Command was able to have a 560 man force (Task Force South) 
in Korea within 24 hours of the President1s decision to 
commit ground troops* Yet the North Korean's, even with 
minimal American resistance, were unable to reach and invest
115
the Pusan perimeter until 4 August-some five weeks later*
The fact that more time was objectively available is 
also substantiated by the fact that the US divisions which 
participated in the perimeter defense arrived between the 
6th of July (the 24th Infantry Division) and the 18th of 
July, (1st Cavalry Division)* At a minimum at least one 
additional week was available for the consideration of op­
tions and strategies* That the DM unit did not perceive 
this is directly attributable to the effects of crisis 
situations as described in chapter one*
As indicated in the description of the sequence of 
events, the sense of time given in the initial stage was 
such that the decision group really never discussed any 
alternatives whatsoever. The pressure to produce direc­
tions, and not having a policy paper on this situation avail­
able, worked to limit the decision unit to a narrowed focus, 
with progressive refinements of the initial policy direc­
tion being considered rather than a discussion of other real 
alternat ivas *
The fact that President Truman and his advisors focused 
on the immediate needs goes almost without saying. Prior to 
the crisis period, virtually all written evidence of the 
importance of Korea in America's long range plans indicated 
at bast a secondary importance. The area was not even
116
considered important enough to seriously contest Congress' 
defeat of the Korean supplementary military aid bill in 
late 1949* Had anyone during this time stated to the 
President that some six months later that he would take 
actions which would commit us to support of Vietnam, cause 
a 20 year estrangement between the US and China, intensify 
US-Russian enmity, and provide the major cause for loss of 
the White House to the Democratic Party, and all of this to 
protect South Korea, it is highly unlikely that he would 
have been greeted as a sage*
It would appear then, that, in the case of the Korean 
crisis that the working hypotheses have failed to be dis- 
confirmed.
CHAPTER IV
THE RELUCTANT DRAGON: CHINA INTERVENES
On or about 16 October 1950 the lead elements of Lin 
Piao's Fourth Field Army crossed the Sino-Korean border 
and occupied the area immediately adjacent to the Peoples 
Republic of China* With this act China embarked on a 
course of action that was to profoundly affect how the 
Chinese leaders subsequently evaluated the role of China 
in Asia, the nature of the Sino-Soviet alliance, and East- 
West relations*
In this chapter it is the intention of the author to 
explore the role of perceived threat and compressed time in 
the decision-making process of the collective Chinese 
leadership which led to this commitment of 16 October 1950* 
In so doing, the paper will attempt to depict the pattern 
of continually increasing perceptions of threat and in­
adequacy of time felt by China's leaders, which eventually 
culminated in China's entrance into the Korean war. It 
will be shown that the reasons for deciding to engage the 
United Nations Forces ware markedly different than those 
the West normally assumes* In stark contrast to the
bombastic, aggressive image that immediately comes to mind
117
when thinking of Red China during this time, the reader will 
see here a very different picture* What emerges is a purpose 
fully cautious and flexible young nation, not at all anxious. 
to become engaged in mortal combat with the "paper tiger” of 
the West*
This chapter has been broken into three main sections; 
first is a brief look at the factors influencing Chinese 
decision-makers; second is a detailed consideration of their 
actions in relation to perceived threat between 25 June and 
16 October 1951; and the final section draws some conclusions 
as to the likely relationship between the perception of time 
and threat and Chinese action during this period*
Two final conrrtents need to be made in the way of es­
tablishing the framework used* First is that the focus of 
this chapter is on the Chinese perceptions, and so will not 
deal with the reaction or interaction of the Soviet or 
American government in any detail* Secondly, the author is 
dealing with a closed society, consequently direct informa­
tion is frequently not available on the thoughts, perceptions 
and actions of key decision makers* Hence the conclusions 
drawn are, by necessity, more heavily reliant on the logical 
implications of data presented than was necessary in the 
other crises observed for this survey*
It is characteristic of this approach that it is not
119
considered essential to know the specific thoughts of any one 
member of the decision unit being observed* It is a basic 
assumption here that the perception of these individuals can 
be determined with a high degree of certitude by observing 
what was said and dons by ths group as a whole at various times, 
in the form of communications and actions*
THE CHINESE FRAME OF REFERENCE: As mentioned in the
first chapter, culture and the particular perceptual set of 
any group of decision-makers is a tremendously significant 
factor in analyzing events. It is for this reason that before 
looking at the events of June-October 1950 it is appropriate 
to develop, at least in broad terms, the particular perspec­
tive of the Chinese leadership. Certainly no decision is 
ever made solely on the basis of the singular situation in 
which a parson is involved. Decision-makers, like others, 
form their evaluations and proposed actions on the basis of 
many factors, only one of which is the situation at hand.
In this section, an effort will be made to identify and dis­
cuss soma of the more important factors that make up the 
decision-making "anatomy” of the senior Chinese decision- 
maJRing nxoup#
There appears to be considerable evidence to support 
the opinion that, given the chance, the new leaders of China 
would have preferred an extended period of international
120
tranquility. The policy orientation with which Mao and his 
associates approached the Korean war was heavily influenced 
by internal considerations. With the Peoples Republic of 
China (PRC) in existance only since October 1, 1949, the 
focus of attention was most naturally towards internal 
matters. Of particular importance were the steps taken for 
political unity and towards a planned economy. It must be 
remembered that at this time a significant anti-communist 
element was still active in China. In comparison with this 
desired period of introspection, the Korean war imposed a 
most unwelcome problem. This problem was to force the 
Chinese to divert their time, manpower, and resources away 
from internal development.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership brought
three pertinent frames of reference to their analysis of the
events of mid 1950. These were the Chinese, ideological and
149
experimental or experience components.
The Chinese component of the frame of reference was a 
combination of factors from China*s sense of destiny and 
"rightful" place in the world as the middle kingdom. Two 
characteristics of this class of perceptions are the concern
149
Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu
(New York, 1960).
121
with China*s borders and a xenophobic fear or foreign devils,
or barbarians. China has long shown great sensitivity over
her border regions with desires manifest in various ways to
expand to control strategic points. Maps even today show
150
borders to the south as "still to be determined". All of
these signs are consistent with the notion that China was 
attempting to establish her critical boundaries at some dis­
tance beyond the legal boundaries. The advance of UN forces 
up the Korean penninsula was to force Communist China to 
define, and eventually defend, this limit. It is of interest 
to note that this "Chinese" component was not singular to 
the PRC leadership. Prior to being ejected from the mainland, 
Chaing Kai Shek had indicated on several different occasions 
that he considered Tibet to still be a part of, and properly 
under control of, the government of China. These statements 
and others in reference to China’s southern borders track 
completely with statements issued by the CCP.
The second major segment is that of ideology. Ideology 
tends to interact with the Chinese component and has caused 
a modification to both factors. It has enhanced the ex­
pansionist e1crant of the Chinese factor through the messi­
anic mission to spread the "true word" of communism. A
150
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modification of sorts was made in changing to a selective 
application of the "foreign devil" label to include only those 
countries outside the socialist camp, in particular the 
United States. Abandoned was the traditional value placed on 
compromise, and din its place came the communist tenet that 
conflict is inevitable; the capitalist system will continue 
to try to destroy the communist countries. As early as 1926 
Mao was echoing Lenin's doctrine of mutually antagonistic 
camps: "The present world situation is one in which the two
big forces, revolution and counter-revolution are engaged
in a final struggle . . .  there is no room for any to remain
.. 151 independent"•
The ideological component provided the following as-
152
sumptions in Peking's policy formulations in June of 1950:
a. The world is divided into two hostile camps.
b. Neutrality is a camouflage for members of the 
capitalist camp.
c. Alliance with the socialist camp is necessary for 
success of the revolution in China and China's survival.
d. Alliance with the socialist camp is necessary to 
promote revolution throughout the world.
e. Final victory inevitably belongs to communism.
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The final component to be considered is the experimen­
tal or experience element# Of tremendous impact in this 
category is the fact that China depended totally on the Soviet 
Union for all information and analysis of the world outside 
her own borders# Throughout World War II, and continuing up 
to the period considered, TASS provided all information used
by the Chinese/communist elites, with the probable exception
153
of Chou En Lai#
This sole dependency on TASS was a result of the PRC's 
inherent distrust of all "foreign devils" (with the except­
ion of Moscow), a tendency to look strictly to internal 
sources cf information and reinforcement, and a growing belief 
in their own propaganda# Much of the news received from 
other sources (American Liason Officers, BBC, etc#), clashed 
directly with basic assumptions of the CCP’s decision unit 
and was avoided or ignored because of it# As a consequence 
of this highly selective filtering of information, events 
occurring outside China were made to coincide with the 
revolutionary experience and ideological dogma that was so 
vital to Chinese leadership.
This restriction of views reinforced the tendency to 
view the world through a strict communist ideological lens.
153
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This filtering process explains such gross misjudgements of
the world around the Chinese leadership as these excerpts
indicate . • •
1936-"The Japanese (proletarian) revolution is not
154
only a possibility but a certainty".
1947-"American economic crisis will arrive this year
or next • • . In the future the possibility exists of
America inciting aggressive war against other capitalistic 
155
countries".
This remarkably narrow vision of the world around them 
makes the Chinese even more susceptable to the "spiral of 
effect" phenomenon. A case in point was the rough handling 
of US diplomats in Mukden during the civil war, and sub­
sequent statements by Mao which created a public atmosphere 
in America in which it was difficult to recognize the PRC.
Mao then, in turn, took this refusal as proof of America's 
hostility to the PRC.
It can be seen, then, that the experimental segment 
of the Chinese leaders' outlook affected them in several
154
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ways. Most important of these were the use of Soviet 
"glasses” to view the world; the selective contact with the 
outside world which reinforced their dogmas and their 
ideologically dominated picture of reality; and pre-concep­
tions of the world which caused others to react in such a 
way as to reinforce these dogmas.
Although the factors elaborated above provide the core 
values and conceptions by which the actions of raid 1951 were 
evaluated, the economic and political situation were certain­
ly vital factors. In the wake of the civil war Mao found 
China facing a grain shortage of major proportions, declining 
production and continued high military expenditures. To 
counter these problems, Mao ordered a partial demobilization 
of the Peoples Liberation Armj (?LA) and return of the units 
to their home bases to assist in agricultural and construction 
work. The northeast (Manchuria) area was especially import­
ant to the Chinese industrial effort as indicated in the 
following excerpt from Peonies China: "Northeast China holds 
the key to industrialization of all China . . .  the rest of 
China looks to Manchuria for the bulk of machinery, steel,
156
and other industrial goods needed to mechanize production”.
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With the efforts being made, China hoped for increases in the 
production of rice, machine tools, iron and steel.
Qn the political scene, far and away the predominant 
consideration was the need to eliminate many groups still 
remaining within the Chinese society that were strongly anti­
communist. These groups ran the gamut from segments of KMT 
units marauding the countryside to depossessed landlords.
At this point in time the need to consolidate and organize 
received the lion's share of attention. In dealing with 
other nations, China's dogmatic insistance on non-recognition 
of any state which maintained relations with Taiwan, and with 
capitalistic countries in general, drove the PRC further into 
isolation and significantly affected the attitudes of the 
CCP leadership.
Increasing criticism from the international community 
on the CPR's actions further reinforced China's dependency 
on the Soviet Union. This dependency was formalized with 
Mao's visit to Moscow on 16 December 1949. The result of 
this visit was a mutual defense pact which stated in part:
"In tha event of one of the High Contracting Parties baing 
attacked by Japan or one of the states allied with it, and 
thus baing involved in a state of war, the other High 
Contracting Party v/ill immediate i y render military and other
127
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assistance with all the means at their disposal’1. The 
impact of this agreement cannot be overstated. Subsequent 
Chinese actions in the international sphere were based in no 
small measure on the assurance of the Soviet Union's military 
support•
Another facet of China's international policy was the
considerable alarm which she showed towards the United States'
changing stand on Japan's role in Asia. The PRC strongly
feared a resurgent Japanese nation, with military bases main-
158
tained by the US. The possibility of North Korean control 
of the whole peninsula was favored, in great measure, because 
of the shield it would provide to the northeast sector of 
the country from the traditional invasion route used by the 
Japanese in the past.
As a final point in setting the stage, it appears from 
what little information is available, that during this pre­
war period China played no active role in North Korea or her
invasion plans, and indeed did not even have an ambassador 
in the country until August of 1950. It is likely that
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Peking was not even aware of the planned invasion until 
Mao’s visit to Moscow the previous December.
Now that the perceptual set has been established for 
the CCP leadership and the major situation influences 
identified, the events from 25 June to 16 October can be 
profitably surveyed.
THE WAR FROM JUNE TO AUGUST 1950-CHINA’S VIEW: The sun had
not yet risen that first Sunday morning when the initial
rounds of the communist artillery preparation came crashing
down on South Korean border positions. At 4:00 am on 25
June the Korean Peoples Liberation Army (KPLA) launched a
coordinated attack against the South Korean forces all along
the military demarcation line. It is clear from information
now available that the Soviet Union, China and North Korea
all expected the battle for South Korea to be easily won by
the North Korean forces under the guidance of their Soviet
advisors. However, the events of the first phase of the
war were to force the communist planners to rethink their
basic expectations.
It can be fairly said that Peking probably expected a
swift victory by the KPLA which was to be followed up by a
159
Communist Chinese invasion of Taiwan* Events of 27 June
159
Allen S. Whiting. China Crosses the Yalu
(New York 1960) 49.
129
in which Washington declared the 7th fleet would neutralize 
the Formosan Straight changed the situation entirely. Al­
though the United States action was taken as a precautionary 
measure, it could not help but be viewed as hostile by the
CPR leadership; they new were faced with few policy choices 
in light of their previously stated desire to invade Taiwan - 
and all of them ware bad. The choices ran between carrying 
out the attack with attendant risks, "delaying11 the invasion 
and switching to a propaganda attack. The latter course was 
chosen as the least dangerous. Thus America established 
herself in a hostile way, by the unprovoked, unwarranted 
(from Peking's point of view) hostile acts. The first input 
to the spiral of effect has been made.
Chinese concern (Taiwan to the contrary) during the 
period 27 June to 30 July was not intense, and this could be 
seen in the Chinese press treatment given the war. Initial 
reports of the war appeared belatedly and in secondary 
portions of the papers. Warnings, when they appeared, about 
possible American entry/involvement, were cautious. Commen­
tary uniformly asserted the certainty of North Korean 
victory and made no specific commitment to the KPLA of any­
thing other than moral support. This period can be character­
ized as one of the watchful waiting with the main effort 
coming from Moscow. Chinese interest continued to be
130
primarily with its many internal problems and with Taiwan. 
What reporting that was done on the war to the South was 
noticably short on bombastic descriptive terms. A combina­
tion of confidence and caution was shown, concurrent with 
reporting the KPLA advances, the mobilization efforts of the
United States forces in Japan, Hawaii and Okinawa were also 
160
reported.
27 July saw a significant, if subtle, change in the
attitude of Peking. In an article for World Culture a
phrase was used that had special significance to Chinese
readers. It referred to "A prolonged wax of attrition will
161
naturally increase the difficulties of the Korean peoples.. 
Depicting North Korean fortunes in such terminology gives 
strong indications of serious consideration being given at 
higher echelons in the CCP of eventual stalemate and even 
possible defeat.
During this same period (mid-May to July) some 60,000 
soldiers of Lin Piao’s crack Fourth Field Army moved to with­
in one month’s march by foot of the Korean front lines. The
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likelihood is, though, that this move was only in part 
motivated by the war itself. More prominent was probably 
Mao's decision on utilization of the Army for economic 
mobilization. Throughout the period 25 June - 30 July all 
indicators were that the perceived threat to China was 
minimal, and her corresponding involvement was the same.
The beginning of August saw the North Korean Army 
close on the Pusan perimeter and a change in tactics by the 
Soviets (who pulled the Chinese with them as acquiescent 
but relatively un-involved partners. This was to be a two 
phase attack. The first phase was Joseph Malik's return to 
the Security Council, after an absence since January, and 
his immediate effort to attempt to get passage of an Indian 
proposal for a cease fire, and have Peking given China's 
seat at the UN. This period also saw a steady change in 
the military situation as the Pusan perimeter stabilized and 
UN reinforcements began to arrive in numbers. The length and 
fragility of the KPLA supply line began to have their effects 
on KPLA combat pcwar as US Air Force interdiction efforts 
ware increased. The changed military situation became mani­
fest with the defeat of the crack 6th KPLA division near 
Masan, 7-11 August.
As a result of this change, the Chinese leadership 
perceived an increasing threat situation. This concern was
132
communicated in a grave new assessment of the Korean wax situ­
ation in which the first estimates of UN strength appeared in 
Jen Min Pao a major daily newspaper used by the CCP leadership 
to orient the masses on 13 August. The article concluded,
"This undoubtedly increases the difficulty of the Korean 
people and cannot but compel the Korean people to prepare for 
a bitter and prolonged war". Although defeat was not men­
tioned directly in the article, it was obviously a possibility. 
Of interest here is that there still appears no consideration 
of Chinese commitment to North Korea.
The 20th of August signalled the second portion of the 
new communist tactics, with Chou En Lai sending a telegram 
to the United Nations stating, "Korea is China's neighbor.
The Chinese people can not but be concerned about the solution
of the Korean people . . .  It must and can be settled peace- 
162
fully". The importance of this message is two fold. First,
it was an effort to gain a peaceful, and hopefully pro­
communist, settlement and, more importantly, it was the first 
time Peking had indicated an immediate interest in Korea.
This message is highly significant as a sign of early percep­
tion of possible threat and efforts to diffuse the situation.
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This change in attitude can be further demonsrated in 
two separate events happening during this time, the "Resist 
American invasion of Taiwan and Korea" campaign, and the CCP 
response to General MacArthur's visit to Taiwan. Both of 
these events were used for the internal mobilization of the 
Chinese people. The former was a propaganda campaign con­
ducted by the CCP, off-and-on from this time forward, to 
begin the mobilization process against the danger of these 
"foreign devils". It is significant, however, that the 
campaign very carefully avoided making or encouraging any 
material commitments. The importance of MacArthur1s visit 
to Taiwan lies in China's xenophobic fear (admittedly rein­
forced by some of MacArthur's statements) of a "sinister 
plot" between Mac Arthur and arch-foe Chiang Kai Shek* Both 
of these campaigns had several objectives. The primary 
purposes being to counter anxiety about war, increase 
pressure on anti-communist elements in China, spur reconstruc­
tion and land reform, and spur the development of numerous
163
grassroots communist organization committees.
An article in World Culture shows clearly the extent 
of change that came about in China's perception of threat
163
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during the month of August. Going from cautious, measured
communications to this one, on the 20th which stated, in
part, "The barbarous action of American imperialism and its
hangers-on in invading Korea . . .  Seriously threatens the
security of China in particular ... it is impossible to
solve the Korean problem without the participation of its
164 -
closest neighbor, China . . . "  It is certainly more than 
coincidental that this article follows the speech of Mr. 
Austin, the US representative to the UN Security Council, 
who delivered a strong rejection of Malik's peace proposals 
and of PRC's right to sit in the UN on 17 August. This 
effectively ended any realistic hope the communists had of 
accomplishing a favorable diplomatic end to the Korean con­
flict. An additional comment by Austin that the UN forces' 
objective would be the unification of all of Korea, was 
undoubtedly pregnant with implications for the Chinese. It 
can easily be seen that the level of perceived threat had 
risen measureably. China was starting to define its 
critical boundary; not yet clearly - but it would be so 
defined in early October.
The World Culture article of 20 August was important
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for yet another reason. This statement of immediate interest 
in the outcome in Korea was the first sign by the Chinese 
decision unit's growing sense of time. Realizing that the 
military situation was changing, the CCP leadership had to 
be cognizant of a limited, but poorly defined, amount of time 
in which to determine their course of action. The events of 
the following months would show a positive relationship be­
tween the CCP decision unit's perception of time pressure and 
its development of its critical boundary on the Korean 
peninsula.
In the period June to August 1950, then, we have seen 
China move from a casual interest to vital concern in the 
outcome in Korea. This complete turnaround was by no means 
remarkable from the Chinese perspective of recent events.
The low threat conditions of the early part of this period 
allowed China to maintain her natural orientation - concern 
primarily with internal matters. But as the military situa­
tion changed, the level of threat increased dramatically. 
China's concern with the expected UN counter-attack, the 
effect it would have on China's borders and political situa­
tion and the middle kingdom sensitivity, all made themselves 
felt.
MACARTHUR MO vES NORTH: From the last week of August to
October 16 a chain of events occurred which saw the
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acceleration of hostility and manifestation of many of the 
classic signs of conflict in a crisis period. Time became 
increasingly critical; opponents' motives were explained in 
a more simplistic stereotyped manner; and effective communi­
cation lessened.
This period ushered in the coordination of Sino-Soviet
165
responses to the deepening situation. The period could
be characterized as one of challenge and response. As per­
ceived from the communist view point, the "imperialist
166
challenge" came in three major forms:
a. Demands by prominent Americans for more aggressive 
action against the Sino-S0viet bloc.
b. Alleged air intrusions over China.
c. Warnings by Truman to China not to enter the war. 
Two prominent Americans, Douglas Mac Arthur and Naval
Secretary Matthews, both made comments that had great impact
on Chinese perceptions of increasing threat, serving to
reinforce their fears. Secretary Matthews in a major speech
on 25 August advocated "instituting a war to compel
167cooperation for years . . . "  On the same day General
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MacArthur, in a speech prepared for a VFW meeting, stated that 
there should be no "misconceptions • • . concerning the rela­
tionship of Taiwan to our strategic potential in the Pacific". 
He stressed that from the island chain "we can dominate with 
air power every Asiatic port from Vladivostok to Singapcre".
MacArthur called Taiwan "an unsinkable aircraft carrier and
168
submarine tender". The Truman administration made efforts
several days later to correct these statements by public 
apologies. However these statements were seen by Peking as 
a crude effort to try to conceal the true intent of America. 
This evaluation by the Chinese leadership was the product of 
the interaction of several of the factors discussed in the 
first chapter. The "information" (speeches) fit the stereo­
types held by the PRC leadership nicely and so were accepted; 
no consideration was given to the complexity of American 
politics or to which speakers were actually spokesmen and 
which spoke for themselves. The ability to separate the 
dangerous from the trivial was impaired in their xenophobic 
fear of a US - KMT attack.
Shortly sufter these statements were made Peking reported 
two alleged air intrusions into their airspace. On 27
168
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September a US plane was reported to have strafed a rail
169
terminal, attendant yards and a nearby airfield* The
United States said a mistake was possible but a method of
verification could not be settled on and so the matter was
left open. Two days later, on 29 September another attack
170
was reported, this time on fishing boats on the Yalu. No
American response to this charge was forthcoming.
Shortly after these events there followed a third
reinforcement to China's perception of increasing threat.
This reinforcement came in the form of a direct warning by
President Truman against PRC involvement in Korea. On
1 September President Truman declared; "We do not want the
fighting in Korea to spread to a general war; it will not
spread unless communist imperialism draws other armies and
governments into the fight of the aggressors against the
United States. We hope in particular that the people of
China will not be misled or forced into fighting against
171
the United Nations". The intent of this message was to
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assure the PRC that the United States had no aggressive tend­
encies. Almost the exact opposite was perceived.
CPR response to these various "imperialist" challenges 
took an overt, and most likely, a covert form. China's 
overt response to these activities was a good indicator of 
the level of threat perceived. This action took the form of 
a series of intense diplomatic protests and militant domestic 
propaganda. This was particularly so with the air intrusions. 
In content and extent this campaign was significant as the 
first clear mobilization of the Chinese public for possible 
military action. Reports were printed from all over China 
of meetings in which thousands offered to go off to war to 
"teach the American aggressors a lesson", as Peking began the 
process of mobilizing the populace to a higher state of 
mental preparation. The covert responses to these develop­
ments of late September remain closed to confirmation but 
it appears that, probably, soma redeployment of elements of 
the third field army took place during this time. The 
immediate implication of these events from China's point of 
view was the continuing shrinkage of available alternate 
courses of action to an overt military response. Each new 
action or statement by the UN forces, particularly the 
Americans, further restricting the perceived room, time, and 
range for response.
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Of interest at this point was a new emphasis in
terminology which indicates a switch in the propaganda
image of the United States from a "paper tiger" to a "mad
dog" (from helplessness to ferocity). The switch was in
ceasing to use the term for passive resistance in addressing
action against the US, and replacing it with the term "K'ang
Yi", denoting active resistance of the sort found in the
172first fight against the Japanese or the KMT.
On 15 September, the US X Corps landed at Inchon. 
Within two weeks the KPLA was, for all intents and purposes, 
destroyed. The swift collapse of the North Korean Army 
accelerated efforts by both the Soviets and Chinese to halt 
the war. The ambiguity of the US position, and the desire 
to avoid war caused the CCP leadership to attempt to 
communicate their rapidly rising perception of threat in the 
form of making clearer their intent to enter the war, if 
their critical boundary, now defined as the 38th parallel, 
was penetrated.
In an effort to communicate the degree of involvement, 
itself an indicator of perceived threat, that China now 
felt in the rapidly deteriorating situation in Korea, Chou
172
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En Lai acknowledged on the 22nd of September that China was
indeed providing forces to the KPLA and implied further
assistance": • • • we clearly affirm that we will always
stand on the side of the Korean people • • • and resolutely
oppose the imperialist acts of American imperialist 
173aggressors". Coinciding with this message, renewed war
alerts appeared in the Chinese papers as Peking began the
mobilization process toward war.
Covert communications were tried to indicate the
crisis stage was being approached. On 25 September the
Indian ambassador to Peking, Mr. K. M. Panikkar, was told
bluntly by the PLA acting chief of staff that "China would
not sit back with folded hands and let America come up to
the /Sino-Korean/ border . . .  We know what we are in for,
174but at all costs American aggression has to be stopped.
As South Korean troops prepared to cross the 38th 
parallel, Chou delivered the strongest warning yet on 
30 September speaking to the CCP central committee Chou 
stated, "The Chinese people absolutely will not tolerate
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foreign aggression, nor will they supinely tolerate seeing
1 7 5  ^  ~their neighbors being savagely slaughtered*'. On 2
October the last warning was issued when the Indian Ambassa­
dor, Panikkar, was told, in a dramatic midnight meeting with
Chou En Lai, that if the United States crossed the 33th
176
parallel it would be considered causus belli. Here, at
last, was a clear statement of what China considered to be 
its critical boundary, however the warning was to go un­
heeded.
On 7th October elements of the United States First 
Cavalry Division crossed the 38th parallel as the UN General 
Assembly endorsed "all appropriate steps to ensure a 
condition of stability throughout Korea". With these two 
events at hand, China felt her options reduced to one. US 
and UN actions had clearly indicated, to the Chinese mind, 
their intent on placing China in a clearly intolerable 
situation.
On approximately 16 October 1950 the lead elements of 
the Peoples Liberation Fourth Field Army crossed over the 
Yalu into North Korea, and the issued was joined.
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This time period showed a marked change in the intent 
of PRC communications but with almost no effect, as the CPR 
leadership changed direction after Inchon from propaganda to 
statements of intent. It could be seen how more direct, ex­
plicit, and urgent the messages because as the PRC attempted 
to convey the crisis situation they perceived, and hence found 
themselves in. The conflict environment reached the crisis 
threshold as United Nations troops penetrated what had be­
come China's critical boundary, China's alternatives were 
seen as non existant and thus she went to wax.
ROLE OF THREAT AND TIME PERCEPTION: As the reader mentally
watches Lin Piao's field army trudge off in the late summer's 
dust to mast its destiny, certain factors and considerations 
should be clearer about the relationship of threat percep­
tion and the decisions of the Peoples Republic of China in 
entering the Korean war.
In developing the relationship, we saw in the first 
chapter that conflict has certain characteristics such as 
a lack of definite territorial (physical or psychological) 
limits, communication problems, a significant audience 
(in this case the international community- in particular the 
Asian nations), and incomplete information. We noted the 
"spiral effect" and selective perception phenomenon. Of 
immediate concern was the effect of high threat on decision­
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makers* Here we saw that they tend to develop problem 
solving rigidity, rely more on stereotypes, have lower tol­
erance to ambiguity, and confuse important and trivial fac­
tors*
To this analytical framework we added information about 
the conceptual makeup and characteristics of the Chinese 
leadership* Here three factors were salient; the Chinese, 
ideological, and experimental factors* To this were added 
the economic and political situation, which produced strong 
considerations for internal orientation as opposed to ex­
ternal interest, and a high degree of sensitivity about the 
presence of non-communist elements on the borders*
With the environment thus defined a series of key 
communications and situations were evaluated* The initial 
period was found to be one of perceived low or no threat, 
and no sense of time urgency and was so reflected in the 
massages of this period (25 June- 20 August)* As the situa­
tion became more ambiguous (incomplete information) the 
perceived threat began to slowly rise* Communications 
problems, namely the failure to project effectively to the 
American decision-makers the Chinese intentions and vice 
versa, and the faulty perceptual framework of the CCP leaders, 
accelerated the level of perceived threat as was shown in 
the content and intent of their internal and external commu-
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nications* The interplay of various basic themes (foreign 
devils, sphere of influence, inevitability of conflict) 
interacted with the above to produce the observed results*
In the final stage (25 Sept - 16 October) the per­
ceived threat became increasingly greater, flexibility in­
creasingly less, time increasingly less adequate, and the 
range of viable alternate decisions perceived to be reduced 
to one*
Some conclusions can be drawn from this complex mass 
of interacting variables which are worth presentation. First, 
the evidence available does not support the idea that the 
industrial basin in Manchuria was a vital consideration*
The issue was ignored by PRC leaders in speaking both in­
ternally and externally* Secondly, the atomic bomb was not 
a predominant factor of deterrence, witness the full state­
ment of PLA acting Chief of Staff 25 Sept* 1950* Addi­
tionally the actual primary moving factors in China’s 
decision to enter the war can be ordered by the level of 
threat, which the CCP decision-making elite perceived to 
their critical physical and/or ideological boundaries• In 
order of precedence they are:
1* The instability of the internal political situa­
tion made it imperative that no anti-communist nation bor­
dered on China to aid and abet those anti-communist elements 
inside China*
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2* Uncertainty that UN Forces under the leadership of 
General MacArthur would stop at the Yalu*
3. A group of factors concerning Japan, as perceived: 
a* The threat of Japanese mi lit airy resurgency if
the US were to be totally victorious in unifying the Korean 
peninsula*
b. Control of the Korean peninsula allowed the 
historical route for invasion to be available to a US-Japan 
axis*
4. Factors having to do with prestige and the interest­
ed audience*
a* Failure to respond would cause the loss of 
standing as the third world’s "progressive" leader*
b* Failure to respond would automatically surrender 
China’s "right” to be heard and heeded in Asia*
c. American dominance would increase its influence 
and lessen that of China*
A survey of the material presented on the CCP decision 
unit fails to disconfirm any of the three working hypotheses* 
However, it must be said that due to the lack of access to 
diaries or internal communications, it was possible only to 
establish a reasonable inference that time became an in­
creasingly salient factor* The other two propositions could 
be demonstrated with some certitude*
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From the internal political situation of Communist 
China developed early in this chapter it is easy to see that 
the long range goals of the CCP leadership did not include 
a major war with the United States* Indeed the statement of 
the acting Chief of Staff says quite plainly that the 
immediate, internal, situation was so perceived that the 
decision unit felt it had to risk its very existence rather 
than have a non-communist government on its borders.
With the abrupt reversal in the military situation 
brought about by Inchon, China was forced to conclude that 
her intervention would probably be necessary. During this 
period between the Inchon landing and the crossing of the 
38th parallel, the PRC moved from non-involvement to inter­
vention* Given the limited time objectively available, and 
the inferred perception of time pressure, the fact that the 
decision unit appears to have gone through a one-choice 
sequence similar to the US decision unit previously dis­
cussed is not surprising. Nowhere in the available diplo­
matic documents is there any indication of any alternative 
being seriously pursued* Undoubtably the ideological and 
experience components of the decision unit’s frame of refer­
ence had a considerable impact in this filtering process 
which led them to believe they only had one option open 
to them.
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So far the crisis periods studied have ended In failure 
in the sense that all have concluded with a state of open 
warfare being declared* The next chapter will take a look 
at a period in which war, possibly World War III, was 
avoided*
CHAPTER V
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: 1962
"Good evening, my fellow citizens
>
« • • within the past week, un­
mistakable evidence has estab­
lished the fact that a series of 
missile sites is now in prepara­
tion on that imprisoned island 
(Cuba) . . ,"177
From these introductory remarks on the evening of 22 
October, 1962, President John F. Kennedy went on to inform 
the nation and the world of a decision which would be con­
sidered by many as one of the most critical made in this 
178century. It was certainly the most dangerous confronta­
tion between the Soviet Union and the United States during 
the cold war period. The President however reluctantly,
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indicated in his address that the United States would not 
tolerate any Soviet missile presence just 90 miles from 
its shores, and was prepared if necessary to risk a nuclear 
holocaust to prevent it. The crisis has frequently been 
called a psychological watershed in Soviet-American rela­
tions. It has been said that a new era of detente dawned
because both sides "went to the brink and looked into the
179abyss and came away shaken".
The Cuban crisis of 1962 was to have a significant 
effect on the relations of the United States and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) and N.A.T.O. These 
relationships were both positively and negatively affected 
by the events of October 1962. The truly profound changes 
that occurred, however, were between the Soviet Union and 
China, with the Chinese charges of adventurism accelerating
180
the already manifest fractionalization of the Communist bloc.
A word should be said about the chronological para­
meters of this survey of the missile crisis. Conventionally, 
the study of this event is bracketed by the first photo-
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graphic evidence (14 October 1962) and the agreement by 
Kruschev to remove the missiles some 13 days later (27 
October). However, for the purpose of this study, it is 
unnecessary to analyze in any detail the events after 19 
October as the basic decision on policy direction was made 
on this date. Decisions and actions occurring during the 
remainder of the crisis period were in essence those required 
to implement and enforce the primary decision.
To present this material in a manner conducive to 
developing an adequate focus on the factors under investi­
gation, the chapter has been divided into sections. The 
external and internal situations are first developed, these 
sore followed by the Soviet efforts to screen the Cuban base 
preparations. The section is concluded with the early in­
dicators to the missile emplacement• With the environment 
in which the crisis occurred thus developed, the remainder 
of the chapter deals xvith the events occurring between 14-19 
October 1962. The paper is concluded with some observations 
on the impact of the information generated on the working 
hypotheses being considered.
The external, or international, setting for the 
momentous events of October 1962 revolved around the set of 
relationships that had developed from the Cold War following 
World War II. Particularly germane to the event under study
152
was the illusory "missile gap" which had been generated in 
America for political reasons. A side effect of this was a 
residual sensitivity to any and all Soviet missile advances. 
Although in fact the United States had more missiles avail-
181
able for a second strike than Russia had for a first strike, 
the fear of superior Soviet capabilities was a constant, and 
not insignificant, factor in American actions.
The Soviets followed a strategy of "minimum deterrent" 
during the 1955-1960 period but changed to increased nuclear
weapons spending in 1961 to counter the alarming difference
182
they perceived in nuclear strength. That same year 
President Kennedy met Kruschev for the first time in June in 
Vienna. Kennedy came away from that meeting considerably 
shaken and worried about the possibilities of confrontation 
with the Soviets. It appears that this meeting also affec­
ted the Soviet leader, but in the opposite direction. Later 
information indicates that Kruschev felt that Kennedy lacked
the constitution to stand up under pressure, and was un-
183
willing to go to the precipice. The Soviet attempt to
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emplace missiles under the very nose of America could certain­
ly be more easily understood on such an assumption.
The general background of the Cuban Missile Crisis is 
probably one of the darkest periods of the Cold War. Within 
the framework dictated by the Cold War, the events leading up 
to the crisis included the downing of a U-2 reconaissance 
aircraft over Russia in the spring of 1960, the consequent 
collapse of the Paris Summit conference, continued testing 
of high tonnage nuclear weapons, periodic Berlin crises, 
erection of the Berlin Wall, the threat of new Soviet efforts
against Berlin after the November 1962 elections, and the
184
continuing ramifications of the Bay of Pigs fiasco.
The Bay of Pigs in particular had considerable impact 
on the manner in which the missile crisis was conducted.
For the puritan Americans, the moral "cost” had been extreme­
ly high. Many of the President's most immediate advisors 
were determined that America would not again be cast in the 
role of a blatent practitioner of power politics. Many 
have said the dismal failure had a great impact on the
President himself and that he felt discredited in the eyes
185
of his countryman and the world. A final result of the
184
Ole R. Holsfi, Crisis: Escalation - War
(London, 1972) 169.
185Jamas Daniel, John Hubbell, Strike in the West 
(New York, 1963) 42.
154
Bay of Pigs was its impact on the Soviet leadership; Kruschev
appears to have believed the President was reckless in the
use of force and lacking the courage to use sufficient re-
186
sources to ensure victory.
By the summer of 1962 rumors began to be heard with in­
creasing frequency that something was happening in northern 
Cuba. Shortly before the increased frequency of reports,
Raul Castro had gone to Moscow. When he arrived he was met
by Defense Minister Malinovsky and the two highest officers
187 ^
in the Russian Air Force and Air Defense commands. IX
appears that this visit established what items that Ernesto 
"Che'“Guevara would "request" during his upcoming visit 
that August •
The visit by Che' saw a highly unusual treaty signed; 
Russia normally makes its clients pay twice for their mili­
tary goods-first in money and second in political influence.
In the treaty with Cuba, Russia forgave all past debts for 
military equipment and in return received the right to 
build a fishing harbour. The American intelligence 
community saw this as a cover for Soviet submarines, intel-
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ligence gathering trawlers and a possible build up for
188"something big". In retrospect the CIA believes the
decision to put missiles into Cuba was made at the end of
189
July and material began to arrive in early September*
As the material covertly began to arrive in Cuba, the 
Soviets laid down the gaunt Ifet to the United States in the 
form of a specific warning* On September 11, 1962, Tass 
printed the following: **The government of the Soviet Union 
has authorized Tass to state that there is no need for the 
Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of 
aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, 
for instance Cuba • • • We have said and we do repeat that 
if war is unleashed, if the aggressor makes an attempt on 
one state or another and that state asks for assistance,
The Soviet Union has the responsibility to render assis-
190
tance from its own territory to any peace-loving state • *"
And so the external situation was set between a President 
who desperately wanted to regain the prestige lost at the
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Bay of Pigs and the Premier who did not believe he had the 
fortitude to do it*
The Bay of Pigs also affected the internal environment 
as well* Part of the reason the President did not act 
sooner was that the only agency among the intelligence 
community that was giving credence to the report coming 
from Cuba since mid-summer was the CIA and its director,
John McCona* The CIA was at the time considerably discredit­
ed for its poor estimates of Cuban national reaction to the
191Bay of Pigs invasion* It had predicated that the Cuban
people would rise up against Castro* As a consequence the 
President was very cautious in his estimates and relied al­
most exclusively on specially trained agents (which had for 
the most part been eliminated by Castro by this time), and 
U-2 flights*
By late August soma evidence was becoming available
that confirmed increased activity by the Russians* On 24
August the State Department Intelligence Chief, Roger
Hilsmann, acknowledged that the Soviets had sent 3-5000
192military technicians and goods to Cuba*
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Without question, the intensity of political sensitivity 
was increased several notches by the fact that Congressional 
off-year elections were only a few months off. Senator 
Capehart, Republican, running for re-election, initiated one 
of the earliest charges when, on 28 August, he claimed that 
Soviet combat troops were in Cuba and demanded an immediate 
invasion* Some three days later an American reconaissance 
bomber was allegedly fired upon by Cuban vessels and Senator 
Keating took the floor of the Senate to charge that in addi­
tion to military supplies some 1200 Russian troops in
193fatigues had been landed*
From the end of August onward Cuba was in the head­
lines constantly* Intense Congressional pressure began to 
build up against the possibility of a Soviet offensive 
military build-up* President Kennedy, forced to defend his 
policies of inaction against Republican critics, became 
more and more precise in his public statements as to what 
the United States would and would not tolerate in Cuba*
(At a campaign stop a sign was held up saying "Less Profile- 
More Courage - We want Action on Cuba")*
During the month of Septexrber, the verbal war steadily
193
Ibid.
rose in intensity for the President* On 2 September an 
announcement by the Soviets that they had agreed to provide 
Cuba with further arms and technical assistance in order to 
meet the threat from "aggressive Capitalist sources" trig­
gered charges from Senators Keating and Thurmond that the 
situation was becoming more serious* The Administration 
officials denied there was any new danger* Two days later, 
on 4 September, the President attempted to allay the rising 
concern both at home and abroad about the Cuban situation 
when he said; "There is no evidence * • • of the presence 
of offensive ground- to - ground missiles or of other sig­
nificant offensive capability • • • were it to be otherwise
194
the gravest issues would arise"*
Growing concern became manifest during this period 
in the form of fear that Castro would attempt to export 
part of his new found military armory to other South American 
countries* A measure of the frustration felt by many 
citizens can be seen in this extract from the Miami Herald 
which said, in part, "People will not long understand why 
US troops are sent to root out Communism in South Vietnam 
when we do nothing to prevent the Russians from taking
194
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over Cuba"*
The political pressure was maintained and other Republi­
cans joined the action* On 7 September the President was 
forced by Republican maneuvers to approve the resolution re­
questing authority to call up 150,000 reservists if Kennedy 
felt compelled on 13 September to hold a news conference on 
Cuba and tell the nation that the Soviet shipments did not 
constitute a serious threat to the United States* However, 
he did carefully list the limits beyond which the US would 
react* "If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were 
to endanger or interfere with pur security in any way •*• or 
become an offensive base of significant capacity for the
Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done
196to protect its own security"*
On the 9th of September the Board of National Estimate 
met in Washington to determine the probability of what the 
Soviets would do* Considering the possibility that the 
Russians might put missiles on Cuba to enhance their image 
in South America and increase their bargaining position in 
Berlin, the board nevertheless held this course of action to
195
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to be unlikely* The board spoke for the intelligence
community with the exception of the CIA, when it said that
the likelihood of a violent US reaction, and the consistent
Soviet policy of not employing missiles outside Russia proper,
197
made that course of action improbable*
The next few days were to see increased political con­
sensus on the urgency of the Cuban question* Congress 
passed a joint resolution stating a willingness to use what­
ever force necessary* Also the first definite information 
on the exist since of missiles in Cuba became available* On 
the 21st an agent saw part of a tailpiece for a rocket larger 
than a SAM and got the information out* Throughout the rest 
of September and early October, campaign discussions about 
American policy towards Cuba continued to hold the public's 
interest* In answer to the Republicans charges of a "do 
nothing" policy and demand for quarantine (Nixon), blockade 
(Mundt, Scott, Keating), or invasion (Goldwater, Thurmond), 
Democrats countered with charges of "hot-blooded extremists" 
who were urging rash action* By mid October the Republican 
National Chairman declared that Cuba had become "the dominant
197
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issue of the 1962 campaign”*
While in the United States the argument over the presence, 
or lack of presence, of Soviet missiles had advocates on both 
sides, the Russians consistently denied any plans to install 
missiles anywhere outside of the Soviet Union* The disclaim­
ers started as early as July of 1960 when Kruschev stated that 
"figuratively speaking, if need be, Soviet artillerymen can 
support the Cuban people with their rocket fire”, and again 
in January of 1961 - "Alarming news is coming • • • they 
/the Americans/ are trying to present the case as though rock­
et bases of the Soviet Union are being set up * * • in Cuba*
It is well known that this is foul slander"* Again shortly 
after the Bay of Pigs (14 April 1962) "As for the Soviet
Union • • • our government does not seek any advantages or
199
priviledge in Cuba* We do not have any bases in Cuba”*
Official Washington tended to accept these statements 
as factual because they saw no reason to doubt Kruschev*
Russia had never put Soviet missiles in a foreign country*
It was not until September of the following year that the
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Soviets said anything about the arms build-up going on in 
Cuba, admitting on the second that they were providing 
"armaments'* and "specialists for training Cuban serviceman"*
On 4 September the Russians became more active in deceptive 
efforts* The Soviet ambassador to Washington (Anatoliy: 
Dobrynin) attempted to reassure Kennedy that the Soviet Union 
would keep pressure off during the election campaign* The 
Ambassador said that he was not aware of any Soviet missiles 
sent to Cuba and stressed that Russia would not put the
200
power to initiate a nuclear war in the hands of the Cubans*
This claim was reinforced by a message from Kruschev to 
Kennedy on 6 September promising that "nothing will be under­
taken before the American Congressional elections that
could complicate the international situation * -* provided there
201is no action taken on the other side • • •" This was an 
effort on the part of the Russian leader to prevent Kennedy 
from initiating any interference, such as reconnaissance 
flights, in Cuba during the missile site construction*
However for a variety of reasons most of the protesta-
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tions of purity of thought and act fell on deaf ears* The 
psychological measure of Kruschev taken by Kennedy at Vienna 
was not consistent with such a view* Additionally, and more 
significantly, indicators began to appear in the intelligence 
communications of a significant rise in the level of activi­
ty in Cuba as early as late July 1962* It was during the 
latter part of July that the sudden increase in tonnage from 
the Soviet Union caught the analyst attention* Most of the 
traffic was going into the northern coastal port of Mariel 
in the Province of Pinar del Rio* All local nationals who
lived in the vicinity of the docks were forced to move and
202
only Soviet guards and longshoremen worked on the boats*
It was late August before the US Government began to 
' expose publicly the information it was gathering* On 24 
August Roger HiIsman, Chief of the Intelligence Division, 
gave State Department reporters a background briefing* The 
reporters were informed that during the July-August period 
over 100 ships had come into Cuba, with 20 of the ships 
carrying large quantities of transport, electrical, and 
construction equipment. Also identified were communica­
tions and radar vans, trucks, said mobile generators* Hilsman 
indicated that they were probably for a defensive system to
202Blie Abel, The Missile Crisis 
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203include air defense missiles*
Just two days prior to this briefing the CIA director
had advised the President that he felt the SAM (surface-to-
air missile) SA-2s coming into Cuba were a prelude to the
204arrival of offensive missiles* McCone had long expected
this deployment because of the geographical advantages of
Cuba: it provided a launch platform which gave Russia's
1000-mile rockets the ability to strike directly at one of
the democracies but could not be turned around and used
against Russia* Another important factor in McCone's
deduction was that the pattern in which the SAM's were be**
ing deployed matched those described by Col* Penkovsky after
205he defected to the West* McCone reasoned that missiles
of the sophistication of the SA-2, which were believed to 
have.shot down Power's U-2, would not have been deployed 
except to defend something of even greater value* It should 
be noted, though, to put these ideas in context, McCone, was 
alone among the intelligence agency chiefs in this opinion*
203
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The conventional wisdom of the day was that the Russians would
not change their well-established policy of not stationing
their nuclear weapons outside of the Soviet Union*
As a consequence of his analysis, the CIA chief
ordered U-2 flights for 5, 17, 26, and 29 September and 7 
206
October* It was the mission on the 29th which first
identified SAMfs in position* At approximately the same time
reports arrived that five or six Soviet ships with oversize
hatches, capable of taking 70 foot missiles, had docked at
207night under conditions of extraordinary secrecy* Odd-shaped 
crates were subsequently seen in transit to an abandoned 
airfield* These crates turned out to be strategic nuclear 
bombers* When all this was conveyed to the President, he 
indicated growing concern about the possibility that Kruschev 
hoped to provoke him into another entanglement in Cuba which 
would make a martyr out of Castro and wreck US efforts in 
Latin America and Berlin*
As September slipped into October, the CIA chief was 
able to gain presidential permission for additional U-2
206
Coral Bell, The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in
Diploifliatic Management (London, 1971) 13.
207
Blie Abel, The Missile Crisis 
(New York, 1966) 26.
166
flights over Cuba* After a five day effort, the super­
secret committee on Overhead Reconaissance (COMOR) gave ap-
208
proval for the missions* Based on increasing information
of feverish construction, the area around a town in western 
Cuba named San Cristobal was chosen for the first mission*
Due to weather difficulties this mission was not able to be 
flown until 14 October - the first day of crisis*
As can be readily seen by reflecting on the situational 
set of this period, the President and his advisors were al­
ready in a threat environment of some measure* Although by 
no means of crisis proportions, as then perceived, the infor­
mation available was frequently contradictory or ambiguous* 
The spectre of the Soviet Premier and his perceived willing­
ness to invite a nuclear confrontation was undoubtably a 
significant factor* The clamor of the opposition party, the 
disagreement among the intelligence agencies and the scars 
of the Bay of Pigs all combined to produce a highly charged 
atmosphere into which a series of photographs were introduced 
that triggered one of the major confrontations of the century* 
While a single dull-black U-2 reconnaisance aircraft 
winged its way south on Sunday, 14 October, Senator Kenneth
208
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Keating (R-NY) sounded the alarm that he had information from 
sources **which have been 100 per cent reliable” that six in­
termediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) sites were under 
construction in Cuba* Keating called on Kennedy to either 
confirm or deny the charge* That same afternoon, McGeorge 
Bundy, Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs, 
in an interview, stated that "• * * I know there is no present 
evidence, and I think there is no present likelihood • • •
the Soviet government would • • • attempt to install a major
—  —  209
offensive capability /in Cuba/ • • *• Bundy dismissed
John McCone1 s notion on Soviet missiles as "beyond belief"*
This view, aptly reflects both the policy stand adopted by
the administration and, surely, the views of the majority of
210the Presidentfs advisors in private* Thus, even though
adequate information was at hand to allow a proper interpre­
tation of what was occurring, the decision-makers, through 
a process of selective screening of stimuli, were molding 
their observations to agree with their pre-formed concepts* 
This was to insure a perceptual, as opposed to objective,
209
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surprise condition in the Executive Committee (EXCOM)*
By mid-morning of the following day, (15th) the photos 
had been processed and analyzed* What was discovered was a 
field enclosed by woods near San Cristobal with the earth 
scarred in a four-clash pattern never before observed out­
side Russia itself* No ballistic missiles were observed on 
this first day but a "tent city" and identifiable missile 
erectors, launchers and transporters were located in the 
vicinity* To a skilled interpreter of aerial photography 
thoroughly familiar with the vast U-2 portfolio of medium
range missile sites, the evidence was impressive, if not yet 
211conclusive* The information was presented that evening
to Rosewell Gilpatrick by the DIA Chief, LTG Carroll* 
Gilpatrick had the DIA Chief double check the photos and 
prepared to brief MacNamara the following morning (16th)*
Carrol also called Bundy at about 8:30 pm at a dinner 
party* After being informed by Bundy of the news, Paul 
Njtze, Assistant Secretary of Defense for international 
Affairs, recalled " * * * we both knew that the Pentagon had 
prepared contingency plans for an invasion or an air strike* 
We both felt that either plan, in execution, would have
211
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212grave consequences around the world * • •” During this 
period other key administration officials were also being 
notified*
With this notification, these key officials began to 
live two lives; one, on the surface, was business as usual, 
but below that existed a secret life of tense meetings, 
awareness of the possibility of imminent disaster, and 
enormous responsibility* A sense of speed in acting became 
a pervasive; all possibilities for successful action were 
dependent on developing an effective response before the 
Russians finished their sites* To complete the picture, no­
body knew how long it would take the Russians to do it*
At 7:30 the next morning the reconfirmed evidence was 
before Secretary MacNamara, but because of the lack of actual 
missiles themselves, MacNamara felt that the evidence was in­
sufficient* Bundy, however, decided that the President should 
be informed and told him at 8 AM* After confirming that the 
information was unquestionably correct, the President ordered 
a secret meeting for 11:45 that morning* To attend were 
the President, Bundy, Alexis Johnson, Dean Rusk, MacNamara, 
Robert Kennedy, Generals Taylor and Carter, Gilpatric, George
212
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Ball, Edwin Martin, Sorensen, Douglas Dillon, Ambassador
213
Bohlen, and Ken O'Donnell* This group of 14 advisors was
later to become known as the Executive Committee of the
National Security Council (EXCOM).
In preparing for the first meeting, Rusk noted that
"it was obvious • • • that time would be the essential factor*
We would have to choose between the risk of eliminating the
weapons and the risk of allowing sufficient time for them to
214become operational"* The first meeting was dominated by
somber reflections on the nature of the challenge from
Moscow* Robert Kennedy was later to recall, "We all agreed
that in the end that if the Russians were ready to go to
nuclear war over Cuba, they were ready to go to nuclear war,
and that was that* So we might as well have the show down
215then as six months later". Douglas Dillon further set the
mood of the assemblage when he noted that "everyone around
the table recognized that we we rein a major crisis* We didn't
know that day if the country would come through it with
216Washington intact"*
214
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The President's first response was one that guided his
217
conduct for the rest of the crisis* felt Khruschev had
purposefully deceived him and was privately furious with him 
for it* From the outset, the President was determined to re­
move the missiles from Cuba* It appears that he also believed 
that a confrontation was necessary* The President's experi­
ence with Khruschev at Vienna led him to believe that the 
probable central motive for the Soviet challenge was that the
move was a major challenge by Khruschev of the American lead-
218er's will and resolve* . The question formulated then by 
the President for his advisors to ponder was not "should it 
be done", but rather "how will we do it?" With this decision, 
the President effectively limited the range of alternatives 
open to the EXCOM* As a consequence those approaches which 
might have produced an international result favorably to the 
US were never seriously considered*
Evidence that the discovery of missile sites was a true 
surprise was aptly stated by the Attorney General when he 
characterized those at the Excom's first meeting as being in 
a state of "stunned surprise" and "shocked incredulity"*
217
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Along with this sense of surprise and the compressed time
available, there also existed a sense of frustration in that
there appeared to be no "right" solution to their quandry;
Sorensen noted it when he said that if the Excom failed to
act, General De Gaulle and other leaders would lose faith in
our resolve and if we did act with force, that the Latin
American and underdeveloped nations would decry American
219power politics.
The President made two decisions that first day; first 
to increase the number of U-2 flights over Cuba, and second 
that there would be no disclosure to the American people 
until the decisions had been made about the course of action 
to be followed. With this the President left to fulfill his 
campaign committments• The first day's discussions amounted, 
in Dean Rusk's phrase, to "boxing the compass”. The entire 
range of possible American responses were reviewed. The 
discussion want round and around without a beginning or an 
end. The first day's discussions ended with a two-way split 
between those who felt immediate action was the answer and 
those who wanted other means. There were generally four 
major approaches: 1) do nothing, 2) use diplomatic and UN 
channels, 3) "surprise" air strike, and 4) blockade. With
219
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this first Excom meeting, the group fell into a rough pattern
in which Theodore Sorensen stated that " • • • the bulk of
our time Tuesday through Friday was spent in George Ball's
conference room canvassing all the possible courses as the
President had requested, and preparing back-up material for
them: suggested time schedules or scenarios, draft messages,
military estimates and predictions of Soviet and Cuban 
220responses"•
Wednesday, the 17th of October, saw the President out 
of Washington to fulfill a campaign committment to Abraham 
Ribicoff in Waterbury, Connecticut* While the President was 
gone the Excom considered, but adopted none of, the several 
different plans under study* The group did however issue 
the instructions necessary to set the military machinery 
working towards providing the necessary "muscle" to imple­
ment whatever policy the President might decide upon* In 
Kennedy's absence, the Excom sat through much of the day 
and the night in Ball's conference room at the State Depart­
ment* People came and went as their duties allowed; some 
listened, some talked, some took notes* As the day wore 
on, the conference was gradually brought under control
220
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by Robert Kennedy; the informal leadership was his by default 
of Rusk and MacNamara*
Beginning with the evening of the 16th, the US Intelli­
gence Board met each following morning at 8:30 am to review 
the latest U-2 photos and estimate the potential danger 
present* On the 17th the following new information came to 
light: 1) additional launchers were now in the San Cristobal
area, 2) 28 launcher pads in various stages of completion had 
been identified, and 3) for the first time MRBM (1000 mile),
and IRBM (2000 mile) "first strike" (i*e* not in hardened
221
sites) missiles were located* Estimates of the board
held that the Soviets could deliver approximately 40 nuclear 
warheads on targets as far west as Wyoming. Although no war­
heads had been identified, the board felt it made no military 
sense to put missiles in position without warheads.
There was considerable discussion this day as to the 
degree of increased danger from the Soviet rockets being 90 
miles off the American coast. One group maintained that it 
did not alter the nuclear balance and the other took the 
opposite stand. However, all agreed that speed was tremend­
ously important. The reports indicated that the Soviet's
221
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missile site construction and the transportation of missiles
proceeded on an around the clock schedule. It was essential
that the Russians be prevented from presenting the United
States with a fait accomplis. The American response had to
222
be fashioned within a matter of days. This sense of
urgency and its continued increase is reflected in the state­
ment by George Ball when he noted "there was . . .  the need 
to keep overflying the missile sites several times each day 
. . .  hour by hour around the clock, the launch pads were 
being rushed to completion. Everyone in the room recognized
that once they were operational the danger would take on a
223
new dimension".
The question as seen by those on the Excom was how to 
get the missiles out of Cuba, and do it without war. A 
series of "tracks" were looked at throughout the day, con­
tinuing around the four general proposals mentioned above.
By the end of the day, the group had been narrowed to the 
ongoing consideration of an air-strike (the fast track) of 
an embargo (the slow track), and the holding of invasion 
plans in abeyance as a possibility of last resort.
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On the following morning, 18 October, the President 
spoke with Dean Ache son, seeking his advice* By the end of 
the discussion the choices had narrowed down to a choice be­
tween the air strike and a blockade*
The Excom met twice this day with the President* At 
11:00 am the first meeting got underway* This conference 
dealt primarily with tactics: should the President tell
the world about the missiles before acting or not? The 
question was to balance the advantage of surprise against 
the moral cost for striking without warning* It was be­
coming obvious that it was not possible to label anyone a 
"Hawk" or "Dove"; each man changed his opinion two or three 
times in the course of the discussions* McGeorge Bundy, for
example, went from the "diplomatic approach" to "do nothing"
224
and finally to the "air strike" camp*
As had become the custom at the start of each Excom 
meeting, the intelligence board gave its analysis of the 
latest information available* At this meeting, the board 
report significantly raised the level of perceived threat 
and sense of compressed time by informing the committee that 
the Russians were advancing more rapidly than had previously
224
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been believed possible and that the first IRBM could be ready
225
to shoot in approximately 18 hours* The reaction to this
was accurately caught by Abel in his book, The Missile Crisis* 
when he noted that "the decision-making machinery was racing 
the clock* There were now two elements of urgency: first 
the danger would soon be operational; second, the possibility
that, in spite of all the elaborate security measures, a
226leak might alert the Kremlin • • •" Sorenson was later
to reflect on this subject and indicated that "as the week
wore on, the tireless work of the aerial photographers and
photo interpreters gave an even greater sense of urgency to
our deliberations * * • Their (the Soviets) construction had
proceeded at such a pace in these few days, that there could
be no mistake, the Soviets intention to have them operational
much earlier than we had anticipated the knowledge that time
was running out dominated our discussions* Not one of us at
any time believed that any of the choices before us could
227bring anything but prolonged danger or fighting".
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Compounding the observations noted above, was the 
possibility that Khruschev was deliberately trying to goad 
the US into action against Cuba to facilitate a Soviet move 
against Berlin* Such a possibility obviously meant that 
the Russians would not be surprised and could take full ad­
vantage of whatever was done by the US* Another considera­
tion that had a strong impact on the Excom was the realiza­
tion that the impulsive Russian Premier had already made 
one major miscalculation in thinking he could get away with 
placing missiles in Cuba and there was no assurance that he 
would not act in a similarly "irrational" manner again. This 
concern points up in actual circumstances one of the points 
made in the first chapter about the fallacy of positing a 
rational being in the normal sense of the word, when he is 
acting and reacting in an environment characterized by high 
perceived threat and limited time*
The Excom reconvened early that afternoon without the 
President, at the suggestion of the Attorney General, hoping 
to draw out all views. The meeting continued into the 
evening hours with the advisors broken into two blocs, one 
for an air strike and one a blockade. Through a process of 
discussion and an impassioned speech by Robert Kennedy 
against another Pearl Harbour - but in reverse, the group
179
came to an uneasy tentative consensus about 8:30 pm that the
blockade (or embargo as it was now called) was the best of a
oo8
bad lot* crucial factors appeared to be that the
blockade did not initially kill any Russians and provided
flexibility for future maneuver*
The Excom then proceeded to the White House at about
10:00 pm and informed the President of their recommendation*
Kennedy accepted the proposal, as he too had come to the
conclusion that the alternatives had too many insuperable
consequences* The President then had Sorensen begin a draft
speech to disclose the Russian missiles and the steps the
United States was taking* Other advisors also began to move
into their areas of expertise to initiate directives and to
prepare for the upcoming confrontation*
The final decision was made the following day, after
giving the air strike faction another chance to state their
case* At the conclusion of an unexpectedly bitter session,
the President decided on the embargo because of its flexi-
229
bility and low initial application of forces* It was then
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decided to make the announcement on Monday the 22nd in order 
to ensure all necessary arrangements were completed* And 
so the gauntlet was thrown down; the two predominant world 
powers of the post-war era were standing "eyeball to eyeball"* 
Only time would tell who would blink first*
Unquestionably a sense of increased threat was per­
ceived and time was a dominant factor for the Excom in its 
deliberations. This was well substantiated in the body of 
the chapter. Numerous statements by all of the participants 
left little doubt that the national "critical boundaries" had 
been penetrated and they consequently perceived high threat 
situation and limited time, which were subsequently intensi­
fied even more as the days passed.
The increasing sense of threat was based on many 
different considerations. The Bay of Pigs undoubtably was 
an underlying factor of considerable importance. The 
President indicated on several occasions during this period 
the importance of national and, although unstated, his 
personal prestige which was on the line. The failure of the 
administration to identify and accept significant pieces of 
information which it was receiving about the Soviet process 
of building up Cuba was a direct result of the intelligence 
community in general, and the CIA in particular, being dis­
credited at the Bay of Pigs. Khruschevfs erratic personality
181
caused additional anxiety because nobody could be sure how 
he would react in a US-Soviet confrontation. Closely tied 
with this was the possibility that the whole Russian action 
was a plot to provoke the Americans into a reaction. If 
such were the case, what would be the impact of American 
action? Finally there was the bomb - the sense of impending 
disaster appeared to grip all of the President's advisors 
at one moment or another.
The sense of time compression could also be seen- and 
its increasing pressure felt. The burden of having to con­
duct the whole operation under the tightest secrecy took its 
toll. Nobody knew how long it would be before the astute 
Washington news corps caught wind of "something big brewing". 
The large number of U-2 flights required added to the strain. 
How long would it take before the Russians realized the in­
creased attention the San Cristobal area was receiving? 
Finally, and most critically, the rate of construction at the 
site locations and the subsequent downward revisions on the 
available time to make a decision, undoutably had a profound 
effect on the Excom and its deliberations. Sorensen and 
many others remarked how time became a major determinant of 
their strategy options.
It appears from the information presented in this 
chapter that none of the working hypotheses have been dis-
confirmed. The first, dealing with the relationship between 
increasing threat perception and the saliency of time, is 
demonstrated throughout the chapter. The second hypothesis, 
dealing with immediate as opposed to long range goals, was 
supported by the immediate disposal by the President of the 
options dealing with "no action" and "diplomatic negotiation" 
Although a case could, and in fact was, made for seeing the 
move in light of overall nuclear balance, and so a small 
change in the status quo, "no action" was never seriously 
considered. When the alternatives that were seriously con­
sidered are grouped by their end objective, it becomes read­
ily apparent that they all dealt exclusively with techniques 
for accomplishing one goal - removal of the missiles from 
Cuba* If it is posited that the long range goal of American 
policy is international stability and a significant American 
presence in it, then the action taken, which, in the end 
saw most of the world seeing Russia as the savior of peace, 
was, in fact, detrimental to our long range interests.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The time has come to reflect for a moment on the 
theoretical grounds from which this enterprise was launched, 
their relevance to the crisis periods surveyed, and the 
implications which can reasonably be drawn from that analysis. 
It was not, and is not here, claimed that this work would 
provide definitive explanations to the important (but necessar­
ily select) group of questions posed in the first chapter.
The most that could be hoped for here was a reasonably de­
tailed "reconnaisance flight" over the prominent terrain of 
the conflict environment and the role of threat perception 
and time compression. Hopefully the work will be found to 
be of adequate detail and direction to act as a guide for any 
topographer who might follow.
To assist the reader in the discussion to follow, the 
three working hypotheses presented at the beginning of this 
work are provided again. They are:
1. As the perception of threat increases, time is seen 
as an increasingly salient factor.
2. As the perception of threat increases, decision-
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makers focus on immediate future needs to the exclusion of 
long range considerations.
3. The shorter the perceived time available to decision­
makers the fewer real alternative courses of action will be 
considered.
It will be remembered that the analytical framework 
to be used depended to a large extent on the reader retaining 
before him, as he reads the various chapters, the manifesta­
tions posited for individuals and/or groups making policy 
decisions in high stress situations. The individual cases 
then were demonstrated through the statements and actions of 
those involved and the correlation of these reactions with 
those found to be representative of high threat/compressed 
time performance.
In the first chapter, a profile was developed which
delineated the nature of the conflict environment and the
importance of several key ideas such as "critical boundary"
230
and "spiral of effect". The study by Postman and Bruner 
was cited for its contribution to the field and several of 
its conclusions were presented. Among the more important 
findings germane to this work ware indications that
230
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perceptual behavior becomes disrupted and less adaptive, that 
maladaption in the direction of aggression and escape occurs, 
and finally that untested hypotheses are fixated recklessly*
It was noted that a host of studies had identified such mani­
festations as increased error rate, use of simpler modes of 
response, problem-solving rigidity, and a lowered tolerance 
for ambiguity as characteristic of individuals or groups in 
high threat, crisis situations* Indications were given that 
perceived time compression was frequently an accompanying 
factor and compounded the difficulties for the DM unit* Con­
sequences of time pressure tended to cause responses which 
increased propensity to rely on stereotypes, acted to disrupt 
problem-solving activities, and impeded the use of available 
information and exploration of alternatives*
This explains how people are said to function, or 
rather mal-function, during periods of crisis* What does the 
information generated from the case studies indicate? July 
1914 undoubtably supports the researchers' findings almost 
to the point* The time factor was a particularly effective
example of the critical importance of perception v. reality
231
to the individuals concerned* Unquestionably the key
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Decision-Makers in Europe had a much greater objective period 
of time available to them to attempt to attenuate the develop­
ing confrontation than was available in any of the other 
studies* However what was perceived, and what was acted on, 
is an application of the Thomas Therom mentioned in the first 
chapter - the decision making elites saw the time as short and 
so it was in its consequences to the problem-solving process* 
With an equally high level of assurance it can be said that 
all decision-makers focused on their immediate interests to 
the exclusion, and in fact detriment, of their long-range 
objectives* Certainly prior to July of 1914 no one would have 
accepted as credible the claim that Europe would be drawn into 
its most devastating war over the death of the heir-apparent 
to the Hapsburg throne*
The period leading up to the start of World War I was 
also an excellent example of two of the elements that act 
upon, and are acted upon, by the conflict environment* England 
demonstrated in its military and cabinet deliberations during 
the crisis period a strong sense of extended natural bounda­
ries; the north coast of France came rapidly to be considered
an essential part of Britain's defense perimeter and its occu-
232
pation by an unfriendly force - Germany, was unacceptable*
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The second element, spiral of effect, worked in textbook 
fashion between Germany and Russia during the later part of 
the crisis, and is the most satisfactory explanation for the 
frenzied activities on both sides in the last few days of 
July 1914, and for the increased influence that the military 
was able to wield on their respective DM units* It should 
be noted, too, that this process became more influential as 
the level of perceived threat and time compression increased* 
A flashback to the second chapter and the level of involve­
ment of, say, Britain and Germany in the early part of the 
crisis as compared with that in late July bears ample proof 
of the relationship*
The study which followed transplanted the reader some 
36 years ahead into the summer of 1950 and into a decision 
that was to have ramifications far beyond the formal cease 
fire finally signed. Again, it would appear that the facts 
of the case support the hypotheses. Time was unquestionably 
salient in this case and in fact demonstrates probably the 
most severe impact on the DM process of any of the studies* 
The tremendous distances betv;een those on the scene responsi­
ble for implementing directions and those responsible for
generating them unquestionably acted to accentuate the sense
233
of time compression* Reports from Korea and from SCAF
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continuously pressed home the need to act almost immediately*
Just as definitely it can be seen that the immediate 
needs or goals, as then perceived by the Truman decision­
making unit, eclipsed the long range goals established and 
proclaimed during the previous several years* Korea had been 
declared to be outside the US Asian defense perimeter and of 
no particular importance to vital American concerns* Yet the 
decision was made to commit ground forces and actively support 
anti-communist governments throughout the Southeast Asia area; 
effectively committing the United States to envolvement on 
the Asian land mass it has steadfastly said it wanted no part 
of .
The case for the third proposition (search for altern­
atives) is equally strong. Numerous authoritative sources 
support the fact that there were vitually no alternatives 
recommended. Time was seen as so critical that the need for 
action was predominant.
The case of Korea is an excellent example of another 
of the characteristics of problem-solving in stress environ­
ments. Stereotypes and simplification in problem recognition 
were noted by several authors, although not in that terminolo­
gy, when describing President Truman's propensity for finding 
correlaries in recent history for the actions taken by the 
NKPLA* The attack was compared to the Nazi attack on Poland,
189
and the idea of letting the North Koreans continue unopposed 
was likened to the disasterous appeasement process prior to 
WW II. A monolithic communism was seen as "extending its 
tentacles in a master plan to topple or dominate" all govern­
ments in the area. The complexity and implications of the 
commitments made in those few days was completely subsumed 
in the vision of an ultimate mission of the United States to 
prevent the Communist juggernaut from crushing an"outpost of 
the free world" — the question rapidly came to be viev/ed in 
terms of good and evil, with the proper choice preordained.
Closely related to America's entry into the Korean war,
conclusions about China's big step proved considerably more
tentative and impressionistic. Working with Inadequate
primary sources, it appears that a reasonably strong case can
be made for at least two of the three hypotheses. The
saliency of time was demonstrated in China's correspondence
and the rapid rise in its bellicosity, as the UN forces
234
approached the 38th parallel. Indirect communications,
particularly those carried by K. M. Pannikar, the Indian 
Ambassador to Peking, showed a significant rise in the 
reference to tiir.3 and the necessity for action within a
234
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specified distance/time if a positive response was not re­
ceived by the CPR government. The validity of the second 
hypothesis, attention to immediate goals, can be demonstrated 
with somewhat more certainty. Unquestionably the long-term
interest of the CPR leadership was for sin extended period of 
peace. This was a brand new government, first declared on 
October 1, 1949, which was attempting, simultaneously, to 
quell the remaining KMT bands roving in South China, profoundly 
alter the life-style of a nation of 600 million, and take on 
the strongest country in the world in a wax 1 It takes no 
great interpretive ability to see that the Chinese DM unit 
could have done very nicely without the last concern.
The last proposition dealing with the consideration of 
alternatives is unfortunately beyond the resources of the 
author. However, knowing that other actions in which there 
were significant differences of opinion ware reflected in 
muted form in New China or World Culture. leads the author 
to suspect that had there been a major divergence of opinion 
within the decision-making group it would have surfaced.
There was no such indication. Additionally, the extensive 
ideological filtering through which all events were processed 
makes it improbable that there was any serious consideration 
of any approach that would be contrary to the "world-struggle" 
precept of their ideological make-up. This latter point is
immediately related to the stereotype phenomenon mentioned 
above. It would seem to be a reasonable assumption that the 
ideological sense of the Chinese decision-makers greatly 
facilitated the probability of their perceiving events in a 
stereotype pattern. Additionally, this is another fine 
example of the process of determining a national extended 
critical boundary. China came to identify the demilitarized 
zone as its outer boundary and a zone about half way up North 
Korea as its critical national boundary.
The final case study was unique in several aspects; it 
was the only one considered which occurred after the advent 
of effective ICBM technology; it involved sophisticated 
communications systems vastly speeding up the reaction process 
and, most important to this study, it was the only one that 
did not conclude in a decision for war. The fact that such 
was the case does not mean that the propositions were proven 
false. It was, and is, possible to avoid the movement to war 
whilst still facing the same forces as those crises which do 
end in war, otherwise the world would be in a constant state 
of open warfare.
The chapter on Cuba left no doubt that time was a 
salient factor throughout the crisis period, and an increas­
ingly important one as the crisis period progressed. The rate 
at which the Russians were able to build the launch sites,
coupled with the always present fear that the Soviets would
discover the frequent U-2 flights (there were 20 between
235
October 15th and the 22nd) acted in concert to simul­
taneously increase the level of perceived threat and the im­
portance of time itself. The evidence presented also makes 
a strong case for the belief that the Kennedy DM unit focused 
on the immediate needs in front of them rather than long- 
range goals which included the lessening of tension in the 
international arena and dismantling of the "gun-boat diplo­
macy" image often associated with American foreign policy.
It comes as a surprise to most students of this event (as it 
did to the author) to discover that it is the Russians whom
the majority of the rest of the world gives credit for * -
236avoiding war in 1962. Certainly it is true also that none
of the many commentators on the events of those hectic days 
mentioned any significant effort by those involved to balance 
the gains to be obtained against any previously stated program 
of long-range goals or objectives.
It is the case of the third proposition that the Cuban
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crisis does not support the hypothesis in question. Even with 
a short reaction time, the Excom considered a wide array of 
alternatives and continued to do so throughout the crisis 
period. However, it is the contention of Ole Holsti, support­
ed by the author, that the result was the product of a highly 
unique factor of this crisis which altered significantly the 
resultant problem-solving approach. That factor was that the 
discovery of the missiles had effectively been kept secret 
from the Russians and the American people. Thus, in essence, 
the Excom was able to work with a semi-static situation in 
which the opponent was not taking any actions to counter the 
US preparations, and secondly, the DM unit did not have to 
face the tremendous pressures for immediate action that would 
have undoubtably been brought to bear had the American public 
known about the missiles. President Kennedy himself was 
later to comment that the ability to delay a decision after 
the receipt of the photographic evidence of missile sites 
was crucial to the content of American policy: "if we had
had to act on Wednesday (17 October), in the first 24 hours,
I don't think probably we would have chosen as prudently as 
we finally did . .
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What then is the impact of the studies conducted on the 
efficacy of the three propositions presented for investigation? 
It is the opinion of the author that the first two hypotheses, 
dealing with the saliency of time and the primacy of immediate 
goals, have, with a reasonably high degree of assurance, shown 
themselves to be accurate statements* The final hypothesis 
dealing with alternatives, is somewhat less secure* It would 
certainly be an over-statement to say that it was disconfirmed, 
but it also would be unjustified to say the opposite* At most 
it could be stated that it appeaurs that it is probably valid, 
but more definitive investigation will be required to go beyond 
that point.
From the analysis above, it is possible to develop 
graphically a representation of these relationships* They 
appear aLS follows:
Threat, Time And Decision-Making
Crisis induced
• en. aDixxxy to 
strike fasta Iperceived timejj 
pressure M
Concern for 
v immed« not 
distant future 1
Over estimate
ijfewer alt* perceived
A
Tendency to 
act quickly
Tendency to act 
less effectively
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It would appear then from these cases, that there 
exists a reasonably clear relationship between perceived 
threat, time compression and crisis decision-making. Threat 
then becomes a necessary, but not sufficient, factor in the 
conflict environment. Threat, or the level of threat * is 
probably the single most important factor in the decision-making 
process in internationalcrises. If this be the case, then fu­
ture efforts to control, dissipate or eliminate situations 
and/or actions which generally precipitate high threat situa­
tions should prove of great value in the continuing search for 
conflict control.
The conclusion one draws from this study is sobering; 
that men rarely perform at their best under stress. The most 
probable casualties of high threat are the very abilities 
which distinguish man from other species; to establish logi­
cal links between present actions and future goals; to create 
novel responses to new circumstances; to communicate complex 
ideas; to deal with abstractions; to perceive not only black 
and white, but also the many shades of grey in between; to 
distinguish valid analogies from false ones, and sense from 
nonsense. With respect to these precious attributes, the 
law of supply and demand seems to operate in a perverse 
manner; as crisis increase the need for them, it also appears 
to diminish the supply. A persuasive case can be made that
196
crisis-induced stress often affects behavior in ways that are 
inconsistent with calculated policy making* In the absence 
of evidence to the controversy, there is no reason to believe
that the ability to cope with intense stress has materially
2 3 8improved since 1914. Thus, even if the findings represent
tendencies rather than laws of crisis behavior, they may 
provide soma assistance for speculation about policy-making 
under crisis conditions*
A flow diagram intergrating salient features of the 
previous models and crisis policy making appears in appendix J* 
As promised in the introduction section to this thesis, 
an effort will be made to present observations that would 
assist in retarding the effects of high threat. The actions 
listed below could be expected to assist in managing conflict 
situations:
1* Where relative capabilities is a major component 
of the crisis decision, the decision-making group should call 
on information that is at variance with the prevailing consen­
sus*
2* When decision makers operate under stress, they do
238
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not seek or accept the advice of habitual critics and so 
should listen closely to the criticisms from trusted advisors*
3. Decision-makers should be specific in establishing 
limits in instructions to the military and should provide a 
check system to insure compliance.
4. Concious efforts should be made to increase 
sensitivity to the adversary*s frame of reference*
5. D M ’s should avoid taking steps that seal off the 
opponents ftescape routes".
6* Every effort should be made to slow the pace of 
crisis events*
7. Care must be taken to recognize the military’s 
institutional perspective and limited range of concern when 
accepting their advice.
The final commitment made at the beginning of the 
enterprise was to provide additional working hypotheses on 
the basis of this research. The following appear to the au­
thor to be worthy of further pursuit:
1* In a crisis situation decision-makers will tend 
to perceive the range of their own alternatives to be more 
restricted than those of their adversaries.
2. As stress increases, decision-makers will tend to 
perceive the range of alternatives open to them as becoming 
narrower.
198
3# As threat increases, decision-makers will tend to
rely more on ad hoc groups.
4. There is a positive relationship between X fs ex­
pression of hostility to Y and Y ’s perception of threat.
5. In a crisis situation, there is a tendency to 
perceive one’s central value as severely threatened and then 
to distinguish many other important values also threatened.
6. The closer an adversary acts to one’s psychological 
space, the greater the sense of threat to one’s values.
7. The greater the perceived threat, the less the 
frequency of interaction.
8. Increased threat and shortened time tend to in­
crease the tendency towards rigidity of perception and thought.
We are rapidly approaching the end of this investigation. 
This does not by any means mean that the questions axe ex­
hausted. Scientific investigation is like the pursuit of the 
horizon, every step opens new perspectives, a solution of 
any problem always raises a host of new questions.
APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGY - W W I
28 June - Archduke Franz Ferdinand assassinated in 
Sarejevo
5 July - Kaiser gives ,rblank check11 at Potsdam meeting 
with special Austrian emissary
10 July - Count Tiza convinced to support action against
Serbia
11 July - Austrian investigator turns up no conclusive evi­
dence of Serbia colusion - report ignored
18 July - Saznov warns Austria the Russians will not stand 
by and see Serbia attacked
20 July - Poincare* arrives in Russia
- Poincare* issues a similar statement from 
Russia as Saznov*s of 18 July
23 July - Poincare* leaves on return trip to France
- Austria delivers ultimatum to Serbia
25 July - Austria rejects Serbia's reply
- Saznov requests partial mobilization
26 July - Saznov orders "Period Preparatory to War"
- France begins protecting RR’s, recalls troops
27 July - Germany begins to get reports of Russian
mobilization
28 July - Austria declares war on Serbia
29 July - Poincare* lands at Dunkirk
- Austria bombards Belgrad
- Russia decides on general mobilization
- "Willy-Nicky1* telegrams indicate Russian preparat
- Bethiuann attempts to gain British neutrality
30 July - Germany declares "threatening danger of war11 and
sends telegram to Czar requesting mobilization 
be stopped
31 July - General Joffre demands France mobilize
1 Aug - Russia says cannot stop mobilization for "technical
reasons"
- Germany mobilizes
- France mobilizes
2 Aug - Britain commits fleet to protection of France's
north coast
3 Aug - Germany declares war-invades Belgium
- France declares war
4 Aug - England declares war when Germany refuses to leave 
Belgium
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APPENDIX C-2
APPENDIX D
CHRONOLOGY - KOREA (US)
12 January 1951 - Acheson declares Korea outside US defense 
perimeter
19 January - House Representatives defeats Korean Supple­
mentary Aid Bill
30 January - President asks for security re-evaluation
10 May - South Korean government warns NKPLA moving large 
numbers of troops south
18 June - SCAP briefs JCS Chief and Secretary of Defense 
that no immediate danger exists
25 June - NKPLA attacks
- James sends first report to Washington
- Ambassador Muccro sends report
- Acheson informed and calls President at 
Independence, Missouri
- First meeting at Blair Mouse - fleet in Formosan 
Straight, aircraft support dependent withdrawal
26 June - Military situations worsens in Korea
- Second Biair House meeting - more aggressive air 
cover, strengthening MAG * s
- UNCOK report verified NKPKA invasion of ROK
- Dewey pledges bi-partisan support
27 June - No major actions - continued monitoring or reports
28 June - MacArthur conducts personal recon of battle area
- Continued scanning of reports by Washington
29 June - Reports indicate ROKA in bad shape
- President presides over NSC meeting - decides to 
allow aircremrt to pursue over North Korea, send it 
ground troops to secure Pusan harbours
- 1 RCT authorized for commitment for defense of 
Pusan harbour
June - MacArthur’s personal recon indicates desperate 
situation
- last major conference held at White H0use - 
authorized SCAP to commit nall resources at your 
command”
APPENDIX E
DECISION - MAKING UNIT:
KOREA 1950 (US)
POSITION
President
Secretary of State 
Secretary of Defense 
Secretary of the Army 
Secretary of the Air Force 
Secretary of the Navy 
Chairman - JCS 
Army Chief of Staff 
Air Force Chief of Staff 
Chief Naval Operations 
Asst. Secretary for Far East 
Asst. Secretary for UN 
Under Secretary of State 
Ambassador at Large
NAME 
Harry S. Truman 
Dean Acheson 
Louis Johnson 
Frank Pace 
Thomas Finletter 
Francis Matthews 
Omar Bradley 
General Collins 
General Vanderberg 
Admiral Sherman 
Dean Rusk 
John Hickerson 
Frank Webb 
Phillip Jessup
APPENDIX F
CHRONOLOGY: CHINESE INTERVENTION 1950
24 June - NKPLA attacks across 38th parallel 
27 June - US neutralizes Formosan Straights
30 June - US intervenes on side of South Korea
13 August - Chinese first given indications of possible 
NKPLA defeat
17 August - Austin states UN should reunite all of Korea
20 August - Chou sends telegram to UN stating Chinafs 
interest in Korean question
25 August - Matthews says: US should "institute war to
compel peace"
26 August - Article in World Culture states China must be
included in solution
27 August - US planes alleged to have attacked Chinese
territory
6 Sept - Malik*s attempt for pro-communist peace fails 
15 Sept - Inchon landing
25 Sept - PanikkaT told China not to allow US on its borders
30 Sept - Chou gives strong warning about anyone 
"slaughtering" her neighbors
1 Oct - MacArthur gives North Korea surrender ultimatum
2 Oct - Chou states China enter war if US crosses 38th
parallel
7 Oct - UN resolves to "take all steps necessary11 in Korea
9 Oct - MacArthur gives North Korea final surrender ultimatum
10 Oct - Chou En Lai warns China "not stand by idly"
(last warning)
16 Oct - China Crosses Yalu
APPENDIX G 
CHRONOLOGY - CUBAN CRISIS
14 July - Chef Gueverra goes to Moscow
late July 1962 - Indications appear of increased shipping 
from Russia to Cuba
22 August - McCone advises Kennedy of possible missile 
emplacement
24 August - State Department discloses Soviet military 
supplies and personnel are increasing
I September - Senator Keating claims 1200 Soviet troops in
Cuba
II September - Soviets warn against interfering v/ith ships
13 September - President declares US will "take necessary
action" against Cuba
19 September - Board estimates admit missiles a possibility
in Cuba but state as "unlikely"
20 September - Senate resolution passed authorizing the
President to call up reserves
21 September - First reliable reports of large 'weapons in Cuba
29 September - U-2 photos shov/ first SA-2’s in position
4 October - Khruschev promises no problems during election 
period
6 October - IL-28 bombers identified in Cuba
14 October - U-2 flight over San Cristobal
15 October - First verification of ballistic missile site
construction
- Major presidential advisors informed
16 October - MacNamara holds initial meeting
- Bundy informs President
- First meeting of Excora
- President goes campaigning in Connecticut
- Excom discusses major alternatives in detail
17 October - First identification of IRBM’S in Cuba
- Serious consideration narrowed to two "tracks"
(air-blockade)
18 October - U-2 indicates missile sites more advances than
expected
- Determined not to have a "reverse Pearl Harbour"
- Tenative agreement or embargo
19 October - Final agreement or embargo
- Departments begin preparations for confrontation
22 October - President announces embargo effective 24 October
APPENDIX H 
DECISION-MAKING UNIT: 
CUBAN CRISIS 1962
Position
President
Attorney General
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Presidential Assistant for 
National Security Affairs
Chief, ICS
Chief, DIA
Secretary of the Treasury 
Advisor to the President
Deputy Defense Secretary 
Under Secretary of State
Asst* Secretary of State
Name 
John Kennedy 
Robert Kennedy 
Dean Rusk 
R0bert McNamara
McGeorge Bundy
Maxwell Taylor
General Carter
Douglas Dillon
Theodore Sorensen 
Kenneth O ’Donnell 
Charles Bohlen 
Alexis Johnson
Roswell Gilpatrick
George Ball
Edwin Martin
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POLICY MAKING FLOW CHART
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